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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONVERSATION 
A. The Guidelines Conversation 
Defendant: What am I looking at if I plead guilty? 
Counsel:  The Guideline range is thirty-three to forty-one 
months.1  There are no motions for a lower 
sentence in your case.  We will argue for the 
“low end” of the Guidelines, thirty-three 
months, the government will likely ask for the 
middle, and the judge will likely impose 
something in between. 
 
 1. For illustrative purposes, the common federal offense of bank robbery 
may result in an applicable Guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one months.  
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009_guidelines/Manual/GL2009.pdf.  This 
hypothetical assumes a base offense level of twenty, a two-level sentencing 
enhancement for financial institution, and a three-level reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility for a total offense level of nineteen.  Assuming a criminal history 
of Category II results in a Guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one months.  See 
id. § 5.A ( Sentencing Table). 
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B. The Post-Booker Conversation 
Defendant: What am I looking at if I plead guilty? 
Counsel:    It is difficult to say.  The law that applies to sentencing 
in federal court changed dramatically in 2005.  The 
Guidelines dictated sentencing and required the 
court to sentence within a range, here thirty-three to 
forty-one months.  Now, the judge could sentence 
you to anywhere from no jail to the maximum of 
twenty years.2 
Defendant: So what changed? 
Counsel:  Today, the Guidelines are just “advisory.”  The court 
must still calculate and start from thirty-three to forty-
one months.  The court must still consider any 
motions to lower that sentence called downward 
departures, which don’t apply in your case.  The 
court then considers some general factors about 
sentencing and imposes a sentence that is 
“reasonable.” 
Defendant: Then the judge will give me something within the 
thirty-three to forty-one months? 
Counsel: Before 2005, my answer would have been yes.  Today, 
it varies depending on several factors: the facts of the 
case, your personal history and circumstances, the 
goals of sentencing, and even which judge we draw. 
The good news is judges are sentencing defendants 
to terms below the guideline range in more than 
forty percent of cases. 
Defendant: That’s good.  I might get less than the thirty-three 
months then. 
Counsel: Well, maybe but maybe not.  That more than forty 
percent statistic may be misleading, because it 
includes cases when the government files motions for 
lower sentences and cases when the defense has a 
viable motion for a lower sentence.  We don’t have 
either in your case. 
Further, based on the process the court must go 
 
 2. In the same example as supra note 1, the bank robbery carries a statutory 
maximum of twenty years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).  Again, with the factors 
outlined above in supra note 1, the offense resulted in an applicable Guideline 
range of thirty-three to forty-one months.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 
1, §§ 2B3.1, 5.A. 
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through, there are reasons that may cause the judge 
to go below the range, within the range, or possibly, 
although not likely, above the range. 
Defendant:  It sounds like I won’t know much, and you can’t 
predict much, even if I decide to plead guilty.  I 
won’t really know anything more about my future 
until the day of sentencing. 
Counsel: I’m afraid that is the state of law in federal 
sentencing right now. 
Defendant: For my own piece of mind, I would plead guilty and 
agree to two and half years right now.  Can’t you just 
ask the prosecutor if she would agree to that?  
 
Prior to the era of the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
(the Guidelines),3 federal prosecutors and defendants entered into 
plea agreements that included a “specific sentence or sentencing 
range.”4  Binding plea agreements served an important function of 
counterbalancing the vast judicial discretion at sentencing.5  The 
federal judiciary enjoyed wide discretion in imposing a sentence;6 
the government’s and defendant’s freedom to contract for an 
appropriate sentence mirrored that discretion. 
In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission (the 
Commission), implemented the Guidelines.7  Congress mandated 
 
 3. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987) (amended 1989).  
The “era” of the mandatory Guidelines is defined as November 1, 1987, the date 
the Guidelines became “effective,” to January 12, 2005, the date of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 5. There are several reported pre-Guidelines, binding plea agreement cases.  
See, e.g., United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 
(D.C. Cir. 1982).  In these reported cases, the defendant thereafter challenged a 
portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to the binding plea agreement.  It is 
important to note that nearly all binding plea agreements present neither an issue 
for appeal nor a need for written opinion at the district court level. 
 6. See Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion 
Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 
67–70 (2007) (outlining the historical fluctuations of judicial discretion in federal 
sentencing theory).  The Court, prior to 1987, sentenced a defendant convicted of 
a felony to a term of imprisonment between the statutory minimum (often no jail 
time) and maximum for the offense of conviction; thus, prior to the Guidelines, 
the court imposed a sentence anywhere from no jail time to twenty years in prison 
in the bank robbery.  See example in supra text accompanying notes 1–2; see also 18 
U.S.C § 2113 (2002). 
 7. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3. 
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that the Guidelines severely limit the court’s discretion at 
sentencing.8  Aside from its legislative goals of uniformity and 
proportionality, the mandatory federal sentencing scheme 
promoted predictability and informed decision making for the 
defendant.9  The mandatory Guidelines effectively replaced 
binding plea agreements.  Upon indictment, the defendant already 
faced his likely “specific . . . sentencing range,”10 as set out in the 
Guidelines. 
Without a need to do so, the Guidelines then further 
marginalized the role of binding plea agreements through policy 
statements and commentary.11  Binding plea agreements, as a 
result, became a stigmatized novelty in federal criminal practice.  
This valuable tool, as a result, has remained underutilized and 
unavailable to criminal defendants for more than twenty years.12 
In 2005, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court relegated 
the Guidelines to a mere sentencing consideration that is no longer 
mandatory on federal district judges.13  The Court introduced a 
new process in federal sentencing.14  The fall of the Guidelines may 
benefit defendants statistically,15 yet the new process will never be as 
predictable and informative.16  After more than twenty years of 
isolated and inconsistent use, binding plea agreements could again 
restore some predictability and informed decision making for the 
 
 8. See 18 U.S.C § 3553(b) (2009). 
 9. See infra Part II.C (discussing predictability and informed decision making 
for the defendant as collateral benefits of the mandatory Guidelines). 
 10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (allowing the parties in a criminal case to 
negotiate a “sentencing range” before the Commission usurped that phrase in the 
Guidelines). 
 11. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, § 6B1.2, cmt. background 
(defining the standard for judicial acceptance of a binding plea agreement and 
over-defining the “justifiable reasons” the court may rely upon); see also infra Part 
III.B (discussing binding plea agreements as meaningless under the Guidelines). 
 12. See infra Part III.A–B (arguing that the mandatory Guidelines effectively 
replaced binding agreements and, through Guidelines’ policy statements, 
rendered these agreements meaningless for more than twenty years). 
 13. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 14. Id. at 245–46 (setting out the new process of federal sentencing with 
“advisory guidelines”). 
 15. See infra Part IV.C.2 and note 222 (discussing the favorable statistics for 
the defendant at sentencing post-Booker).  In 2009, district court judges imposed 
sentences below the applicable Guidelines range in more than forty-three percent 
of federal criminal cases and the average variance from the Guideline range in 
these cases has increased as well.  See infra Part IV.C.2 and note 222. 
 16. See infra Part II.C (discussing predictability and informed decision making 
as collateral benefits of the mandatory Guidelines for the individual defendant). 
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defendant.17 
We do not have to be resigned to the above conversation as the 
post-Booker norm.  This article argues that in addition to the swing 
toward increased judicial discretion and overall lower sentences, 
the pendulum also can swing toward predictability and informed 
decision making for the defendant.  The federal sentencing 
scheme must allow a defendant to pursue, negotiate, and contract 
for what the defendant believes is a uniform, proportional, and fair 
sentence.18  Increased use of binding plea agreements in federal 
court could complement the progressive developments following 
Booker and restore some predictability and informed decision 
making to federal sentencing.19  However, without significant rule, 
policy, and perception changes, like those proposed in Part VI of 
this article, binding plea agreements will continue to be disfavored 
by some district courts,20 carry an unwarranted stigma among 
prosecutors,21 and remain underutilized and largely unavailable to 
 
 17. See infra Part V (discussing a renewed role for binding plea agreements 
post-Booker); infra Part VI (proposing rule, policy, and perception changes to 
encourage binding plea agreements in federal criminal practice and restore some 
predictability and informed decision making for the defendant).  
 18. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (setting out some specific terms that may appear 
in federal plea agreements, including “specific sentences” and applicability of 
Guidelines’ provisions); see generally Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government 
Promises: A Contract-Based Approach To Enforcing Plea Bargains, 38 N.M. L. REV. 159 
(2008) (discussing that a solution to the problem would be to apply contract law 
principles consistently and fairly in enforcing plea agreements); Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). 
 19. See infra Part V (proposing a renewed role for binding plea agreements 
post-Booker). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v Seidman, 483 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Wis. 1980) 
(“At the outset, the Court would note that it never will accept a [binding] plea 
agreement.  It is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of sentence that 
should be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or she has been 
adjudged guilty.”); cf. United States v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d. 844, 845 (D. Neb. 
2005) (“When such a plea agreement smells too much like cow manure siphoned 
from a feedlot after a swampy, summer rain, judges should not pretend the odor is 
lilac.  On the other hand, if the plea agreement stinks, but the stench is more like 
kitty litter than cow manure, a judge should hold his or her nose and move on.  
The trick is to discern the difference.”); see infra note 241 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating how district court judges may continue to disfavor binding plea 
agreements after the Supreme Court restored their discretion in Booker).  In Coney, 
the district court judge ultimately accepted a binding plea agreement calling for a 
sentence below the Guidelines.  See Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (finding 
“justifiable reasons” to accept the binding plea agreement). 
 21. See infra notes 88–92 and 237–39 (discussing Department of Justice 
protocol that discouraged the type of discounted binding plea agreements 
Congress intended when it enacted FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C)). 
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criminal defendants. 
Part II of this article presents a brief historical background of 
federal sentencing and the policy goals behind the Guidelines’ 
implementation.  Part III discusses the binding plea agreement 
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  This 
Part also explains how the mandatory Guidelines effectively 
replaced the binding plea agreement and how the Commission and 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) have marginalized the use of this 
valuable tool for more than twenty years.  Part IV summarizes the 
constitutional challenge to judicial findings of sentencing 
enhancements that was ultimately struck down in Booker, as well as 
the disconnect between the constitutional challenge and the 
Court’s ultimate remedy of rendering the Guidelines “advisory.”  
This Part also discusses the current state of federal sentencing 
practice post-Booker in terms of renewed judicial discretion, the 
benefit to defendants, and liberated prosecutors. 
Part V proposes that binding plea agreements should again 
become an integral part of federal practice.  Last, Part VI proposes 
rule, policy, and perception changes that can assist in establishing a 
renewed role for binding plea agreements in federal criminal 
practice.  These include proposed revisions to Rule 11 and the 
Guidelines’ treatment of binding plea agreements, a proposed 
model local rule, and sample plea agreement language, each 
designed to encourage the use of binding plea agreements after 
Booker.  These changes are designed to promote predictability and 
informed decision making at sentencing. 
II. FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY AND THE EVOLVING 
LANDSCAPE 
Keeping current with the changes in federal sentencing has 
been a challenging proposition since the late 1990s.22  The 
evolution from pre-Guidelines to post-Guidelines federal 
sentencing can be described as “coming full circle.”23  Yet, for the 
 
 22. See also infra Part II.D.2 (discussing how the Guidelines amplified episodes 
of prosecutorial discretion); Part III.B and note 90 (discussing sub rosa 
understandings in binding plea agreements); see also John Gleeson, The Sentencing 
Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Role of the Courts in Policing Sentence 
Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 648–50 & n.38–44 (2008) (discussing binding 
plea agreements that were sent underground by the mandatory Guidelines). 
 23. See Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion 
Revived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 650 (2006) (discussing Booker’s 
almost twenty-year impact on federal sentencing); see also Douglas A. Berman, 
  
476 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
individual defendant, the post-Booker state of federal sentencing is 
lacking in consistency and predictability.24  The seismic changes in 
Booker were progressive and positive developments.  For purposes of 
this article, it is assumed that federal sentencing is more 
sophisticated, well-reasoned, and fair today than it was before the 
mandatory Guidelines. 
A. Before the Mandatory Guidelines 
 Prior to 1987, federal district court judges imposed criminal 
sentences based on their own notions of fairness, compassion, and 
justice.25  Because each judge was left to apply his or her own 
 
Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 142, 142 (2006) 
(“Booker and § 3553(a) thus demand that federal sentencing judges exercise 
reasoned judgment by filtering the Guidelines’ advice through the provisions of § 
3553(a); by doing so, district judges avoid giving any particular judge-found fact a 
‘determinate’ role in calculating the sentence, and thereby avoid the 
constitutional problem identified in Booker.”); Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More 
Things Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness 
Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 118 (2008) (outlining the transition from 
sentencing in the discretion of the judges pre-Guidelines to sentencing under the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
 24. See David C. Holman, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita, and 
Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 288 
(2008) (“Because the presumption is a ‘nonbinding appellate presumption,’ the 
sentencing judge is not required to impose a Guidelines sentence.  The Court 
assumed that the district court judge may freely assign any sentence between the 
statutory minimum and maximum.  If that is the case, then judge-found facts and 
the advisory Guidelines range are mere factors among many that judges may use 
to select a sentence.  A judge could find facts that would triple a Guidelines 
sentence, but still permissibly sentence the defendant well below the Guidelines 
range. The constitutionality of the presumption of reasonableness completely 
depends on the truly advisory nature of the Guidelines.”); Jefferson Exum, supra 
note 23, at 124 (“Researchers have explained that ‘[t]o the extent that judges use 
different judgmental anchors to make their sentencing decisions, the resulting 
sentences are likely to differ.’” (citing Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, 
Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1535, 1537 (2001))). 
 25. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 31, 38 (1983); see also Brief for the United States 
Sentencing Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Claiborne v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 173622, at *1 (“Before 
the Act, ‘each judge [was] left to apply his own notions of the purposes of 
sentencing.  As a result, . . . Federal judges mete[d] out [a] . . . wide range of 
sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes, 
committed under similar circumstances.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38) 
(alterations in original)); Christine DeMaso, Advisory Sentencing and the 
Federalization of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity Between 
State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2099 (2006) 
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notions of the purpose of sentencing, the federal sentencing system 
exhibited “an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders . . . 
convicted of similar crimes.”26  Courts even differed about which 
considerations to apply at sentencing.  Before the mandatory 
Guidelines, where charges were brought and which judge would 
preside were as important to the criminally accused as what charges 
were brought.27 
Federal sentencing lacked clear policy statements and 
considerations to guide lifetime-appointed judges when evaluating 
individual defendants and their offense conduct.  Congress grew 
concerned with unfettered judicial discretion at sentencing.28  The 
dangers of a sentencing scheme overly reliant on judicial discretion 
and without articulated goals were expressed in terms of 
“unwarranted sentencing disparity” and the need for “uniformity.”29  
Further, the larger public policy discussions about the utility and 
effect of punishment and the criminal justice system’s role in 
serving those goals gained momentum during the 1970s and early 
1980s.30  Congress reacted to a negative public perception of the 
 
(discussing how pre-Guidelines “judges had nearly absolute and unreviewable 
sentencing discretion”). 
 26. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 31, 38.  Senator Ted Kennedy argued that 
sentencing guidelines were necessary because “[f]ederal criminal sentencing is a 
national disgrace.  Under current sentencing procedures, judges mete out an 
unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders convicted of similar crimes.”  
130 CONG. REC. 1644 (1984). 
 27. See generally James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring 
Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. 
& ECON. 271 (1999). 
 28. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
364 (1989) (“Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing 
judge to determine” a convicted defendant’s sentence, but a review of the 
legislative history strongly suggests that the sentencing disparity that Congress 
hoped to eliminate did not stem from prosecutorial discretion, but instead from 
unchecked judicial discretion in formulating sentences.); United States v. 
LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1400 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Three principal forces propelled the 
legislation: Congress sought to establish truth in sentencing by eliminating parole, 
to guarantee uniformity in sentencing for similarly situated defendants, and to 
ensure that the punishment fit the crime.”), rev’d on other grounds,  520 U.S. 751 
(1997). 
 29. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 135398 Stat. 
1837 (1987), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38–59 
(collectively S. REP. NO. 98-225). 
 30. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: 
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 24–43 (1974). 
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federal system’s lack of a sentencing scheme.31  
These influences eventually compelled Congress to draft 
legislation and overhaul federal sentencing.32  Congress passed the 
most comprehensive federal sentencing legislation in history, the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA),33 and therein created the 
Commission.34  As part of the SRA, Congress introduced into 
federal criminal jurisprudence statutes setting forth “factors to be 
considered” at sentencing and other issues related to sentencing.35 
The Commission was charged with fundamentally changing 
federal sentencing and the wide disparity of results throughout the 
federal system.36  The Commission also published policy statements, 
additional sentencing considerations, and commentary.  The 
culmination of the Commission’s work was implemented as the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.  The Guidelines 
incorporated and expanded the statutory sentencing factors37 and, 
in turn, a corresponding statute made the Guidelines mandatory in 
federal court.38  Congress expressly tasked the Commission with 
collecting federal sentencing data.  The Commission’s ongoing 
function was to assess and adjust the Guidelines accordingly.39  The 
Commission did, and still does, just that.40   
 
 31. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 39. 
 34. See id. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2009). 
 36. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39. 
 37. The Guidelines are “the expert attempt” of the Commission to “weigh 
[the § 3553(a) sentencing] factors in a variety of situations.”  United States v. 
Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 38. Prior to Booker, federal criminal practitioners and district court judges 
paid little attention to the “factors to be considered at sentencing” in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).  This supports the premise that policy statements and “goals” would likely 
be ignored if they are not mandatory.  Today, practitioners and judges recite and 
apply the factors in § 3553(a) because appellate courts have remanded and held 
that sentences are procedurally unreasonable if the factors were not considered on 
the record.  See infra note 222 (outlining the procedural and substantive 
components of the “reasonableness” review on appeal). 
 39. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2010).  The Commission continues to collect data 
and draft modifications to the Guidelines.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra 
note 1, § 5H1.11 (stating the recently added sentencing considerations for 
military, civic, charitable, or public service); Notice of Final Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 
46478, 46479 (Sept. 9, 2009) (stating the policy priorities identified in response to 
public comment on proposed priorities). 
 40. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“In addition 
to the duty the Commission has to promulgate determinative-sentence guidelines, 
it is under an obligation periodically to ‘review and revise’ the guidelines.” 
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Congress did not envision, nor did the Commission set out to 
develop, the most complicated mathematical word problem known 
anywhere in criminal law.41  Yet, once the Commission embarked 
upon the enormous task of reducing federal convictions into a 
complex matrix calculation, the result was inevitable.42  The 
Commission, with some foresight and flexibility, designed its work 
to develop based upon appellate court interpretation and further 
legislative action.43  The Commission’s mandate and continued 
functions are designed to promote the goals of uniformity and 
proportionality at sentencing.44   
B. Uniformity and Proportionality Under the Mandatory Guidelines  
The federal criminal justice system needed a new sentencing 
scheme to promote uniformity45 and proportionality.46  The 
 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. 994(o) (1988))).   
 41. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an 
Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571, 584 (1992).  “In the end, the 
Commission had to balance the comparative virtues and vices of broad, simple 
categorization with detailed, complex subcategorization and devise a system that 
could most effectively meet the statutory goals of sentencing reform.”  Id. at 575. 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 1346 (6th Cir. 1990) 
(Ryan, J., concurring) (discussing the “complex matrix of presumptions, rules, 
regulations, and arithmetical formulae that comprise the sentencing guidelines”). 
 43. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (“The spirit of 
compromise that permeates the Guidelines arose out of the practical needs of 
administration, institutional considerations, and the competing goals of a criminal 
justices system . . . .”). 
 44. See JACK M. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 10 (1980); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent 
of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 785 (2006) (“Rising 
departure rates [from the Commission’s mandates] can thus fairly be 
characterized as an indication that many judges lack a strong commitment to the 
guidelines’ vision of uniformity.”); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role 
of Sentencing Guidelines Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 70 (1993) (“[T]he SRA seeks to reconcile competing goals 
of proportionality and uniformity.”). 
 45. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1336, 1336 (2004) (“[R]educing sentencing disparity . . . requires a coherent 
underlying theory of punishment, because disparity is not a self-defining 
concept.”); O’Hear, supra note 44, at 750 (“[U]niformity seeks to eliminate 
unwarranted sentencing disparities, but also to provide for warranted disparities. 
The problem lies in distinguishing the warranted from the unwarranted.”); Julie 
R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1352–62 (1997) (defending the Guidelines while 
describing Congress’s goals). 
 46. See 28 U.S.C § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 
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Commission implemented the Guidelines to include definitive 
provisions and policy statements aimed at these goals.  The policy 
statements and commentary aim to promote uniformity and 
proportionality in the federal system.47  A uniform sentencing 
system promotes honesty, fairness, and justice.48   
Congress, at the same time, promulgated a statute that made 
the Guidelines binding on federal judges.49  The mandatory nature 
of the Guidelines further supported the goals of uniformity and 
proportionality.50  The mandatory Guidelines also leveled the 
disparity among jurisdictions and individual judges and curbed 
forum shopping and prosecutorial gamesmanship.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1, § 1A1.3 (Congress set out three goals in the preamble to the Guidelines: (1) 
“honesty in sentencing”; (2) “uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide 
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar 
offenders”; and (3) “proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes 
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.”); see 
also infra Part V.A (discussing how the Supreme Court, in formulating the 
“reasonableness” standard of review, has centered on uniformity, as opposed to 
predictability and informed decision making for the individual defendant). 
 47. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a)(2), 995(a)(1) (2010) (requiring the Commission 
to issue “general policy statements” regarding the application of the guidelines 
and to “establish general policies . . . as are necessary to carry out the purposes” of 
the legislation). 
 48. See 28 U.S.C § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010) (stating that the purposes of the 
United States Sentencing Commission are to “provide certainty and fairness in 
meeting the purposes of sentencing”); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: 
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2004) (citing “honesty” as a 
goal in the federal sentencing scheme). 
 49. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010). 
 50. Multiple sections of the Guidelines Manual outline mandatory minimum 
sentences.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, §§ 2A3.6, 2B1.5, 2D21; see 
also O’Hear, supra note 44, at 785 (“Still, while prosecutors may encourage or 
acquiesce, the decision to depart ultimately lies with the judge.  Rising departure 
rates can thus fairly be characterized as an indication that many judges lack a 
strong commitment to the guidelines’ vision of uniformity.”) (citing Miller, supra 
note 48, at 1237–38). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(noting the prosecution’s  deliberate attempt at gaining a tactical advantage 
through forum shopping); see generally Steve Y. Koh, Reestablishing the Federal Judge’s 
Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1120–21 (1992) (discussing the prosecutorial 
gamesmanship inherent in gathering information for the court’s consideration at 
sentencing and in U.S. Probation’s presentencing reports). 
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The Commission crafted well-defined categories of offensive 
conduct, enhancements, and reductions52 combined with narrowly 
constructed grounds for departure.53  Similarly situated defendants, 
those who committed similar offenses with similar characteristics 
and having similar criminal histories were treated uniformly, or as 
consistently as possible,54 throughout the country.55  Amendments 
 
 52. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, §§ 
217(a), 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020, 2032 (1984); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 1, chs. 2–3 (defining the many offense conduct and reduction 
calculations in the Guidelines). 
 53. The Guidelines define its created terminology, including offense level, 
reduction, enhancement, and departure.  The court’s narrow departure authority 
was set out in U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5K2.0 (Grounds for 
Departure); see also id. § 5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol 
Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction), § 5H1.6 (Family Ties and 
Responsibilities), § 5H1.7 (Role in the Offense), § 5H1.8 (Criminal History), § 
5K2.10 (Victim’s Conduct), § 5K2.12 (Coercion and Duress), § 5K2.13 
(Diminished Capacity), § 5K2.20 (Aberrant Behavior).  Prior to Booker, if the court 
departed from the guideline range, an appellate court could review the 
“reasonableness” of the departure.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2010). 
 54. The United States Attorney’s Manual describes how the “United States 
Attorney, within his/her district, has plenary authority with regard to federal 
criminal matters.” See U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 9–2.001 (1997) [hereinafter ATTORNEY’S MANUAL], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam
/index.html.  This plenary authority creates legitimate, yet tangible, differences 
and the justified disparity in legitimate prosecutorial practices, or even a disparity 
in sentences resulting from prosecutorial practices, is rarely, if ever, a proper basis 
for departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 1, § 1B1.1.    
  The U.S. Attorney and his or her delegates, through local rules and 
practices and “internal policy,” create different standards for declinations, see 
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL at § 9-2.020, charging thresholds or otherwise authorizing 
prosecution, id. § 9-2.030, post-indictment charging by information and dismissal 
of indictments, id. § 9-2.050, acceptance of responsibility reductions, id. § 3B1.1, 
filing substantial assistance downward departure motions and valuing downward 
departure motions, id. § 5K1.1, and filing special informations related to statutory 
enhancements, see 21 U.S.C. § 851 (1970) (requiring filing of special information 
related to prior convictions); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 761–62 
(1997) (describing a prosecutor’s discretion to “determine whether a particular 
defendant will be subject to the enhanced statutory maximum, . . .” [such as an 
851 enhancement, which is] “similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises when 
he decides what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect”); ATTORNEY’S 
MANUAL, supra, § 9-27.450 (requiring a formal “approval system” but deferring to 
the U.S. Attorney to establish the parameters of the system).   
 55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2010) (incorporating uniformity into the 
“factors to be considered” at sentencing); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Duty to 
Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 627, 629 (2006) (“In the post-Booker world, the most common use of [18 
U.S.C. § 3553](a)(6) has perhaps been as a basis for reducing or eliminating the 
  
482 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
to the Guidelines, appellate decisions, and sentencing proceedings 
interpreting the Guidelines discussed specific case facts and 
offender characteristics in terms of these goals.56  In practice, 
however, the mandatory Guidelines were not without loopholes 
that undercut true uniformity.57 
C. Predictability and Informed Decision Making 
Predictability and informed decision making served as oft-
overlooked collateral benefits of the mandatory federal sentencing 
scheme.58  The Supreme Court has discussed federal sentencing in 
terms of its predictability during the mandatory Guidelines era.59 
The Guidelines were inflexible, draconian, and skewed toward 
harsher punishments; yet, they were predictable as to the outcome 
and, for better or worse, provided valuable information to the 
defendant early in a criminal case.  The predictability and 
information inherent to the Guidelines led to more informed 
decisions about guilty pleas, meaningful cooperation, and the risk 
 
differences in sentences that would otherwise be imposed on co-defendants 
pursuant to the Guidelines.”); DeMaso, supra note 25 (noting that prior to the 
Guidelines, “judges had nearly absolute and unreviewable sentencing discretion”). 
 56. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 467–68 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(denying the defendant’s motion for downward departure based upon 
proportionality with co-defendants and holding that “[b]asic notions of fairness 
dictate that defendants should be sentenced in proportion to their crimes . . . .  
[Yet, a] downward departure to correct sentencing disparity brings a defendant’s 
sentence more into line with his or her codefendant’s sentence, but places it out 
of line with sentences imposed on all similar offenders in other cases”). 
 57. See infra Part II.D (discussing the loopholes and lack of uniformity in the 
federal sentencing system under the Guidelines and in matters left to 
prosecutorial discretion).  See generally Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION  255 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604611 (exploring the “localized meaning” of 
provisions in the Guidelines, such as departures for “substantial assistance” to law 
enforcement and reductions for “acceptance of responsibility”). 
 58.  See Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Comment, Constitutional Law: Predictability as 
Fairness and the Possible Return to Federal Indeterminate Sentencing, 57 FLA. L. REV. 999, 
1006–10 (2005) (analyzing Booker and noting that the decision allows defendants 
to better “predict the term of incarceration that they face at the commencement 
of the criminal proceeding”). 
 59.  See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (stating that the 
pre-Guidelines system of indeterminate sentencing lacked “uniformity, 
predictability, and a degree of detachment”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 366 (1989) (discussing how the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing scheme led 
to “widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties” regarding federal 
sentencing). 
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associated with trial.60  The Guidelines also permitted the 
defendant to be involved in deciding his or her own fate. 
The mandatory Guidelines empowered defendants with more 
pointed advice from counsel and, accordingly, more informed 
decision making.  A defendant pleading guilty during the 
mandatory Guidelines era had a firm understanding about what lie 
ahead at sentencing.  The individual defendant valued the benefits 
of predictability and informed decision making as much as, if not 
more than, Congress’s and the Commission’s goals of uniformity 
and proportionality. 
The loss of benefits like predictability and the defendant’s 
information at sentencing may be an ancillary cost of the 
progressive developments in federal sentencing.  Some might opt 
for overall lower sentences instead of generalized notions of 
predictability and informed decision making.  The argument begs 
the question: can judicial discretion and a more individualized 
federal sentencing scheme coexist with the defendant’s need for 
predictability and informed decision making at sentencing?  As 
argued in this article, through the use of binding plea agreements, 
the answer is yes.61 
D. “One Size Fits All” Did Not Fit  
The mandatory Guidelines had an adverse impact on all 
involved in a federal sentencing proceeding.62  The district court 
 
 60.  In the federal criminal system, sentencing and cooperation are 
intertwined throughout the procession of a case.  See ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra 
note 54, § 9-27.230 (listing general guidelines for federal prosecution and 
declination of prosecution, including the person’s willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation or prosecution of others and the probable sentence or other 
consequences if the person is convicted); see also George C. Harris, Testimony for 
Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 9, 13 (2000) 
(equating “cooperation agreements” to government bribery). 
 61. See infra Part V (discussing the renewed role for binding plea agreements 
to restore the predictability and informed decision making lost after Booker). 
 62. The Guidelines significantly curtailed judicial discretion at sentencing.  
The sentencing court exercised its discretion within a range of six or twelve 
months in most cases, as compared to a span of ten-to-twenty years established by 
statute.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1.  The Guidelines similarly 
impacted prosecutorial discretion in most matters related to sentencing.  After the 
decisions related to charging and potential cooperation, the federal prosecutor 
played a minimal role in the sentencing of most defendants.  Id.  Most 
importantly, the Guidelines prescribed an outcome for the individual defendant 
based upon his offense conduct and criminal history, and with less attention to his 
individual circumstances.  See supra note 53 (listing some of the individual 
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judge, prosecutor, and individual defendant each had their role 
significantly limited by the mandatory Guidelines.63  A “one size fits 
all” approach unfairly simplified and categorized the difficult task 
of sentencing individual defendants.64  The Guidelines dictated the 
process and hamstrung the parties for almost twenty years while 
mandatory and, to some degree, still do so today.65 
With a limited role in the “plea and sentence” federal system, 
the balance of the district court’s impressions, compassion, or ire 
about a case or an individual defendant were pigeon-holed into its 
“discretion” to sentence within a relatively small range of options.66  
The Guidelines severely usurped most post-indictment situations 
reserved for prosecutorial discretion,67 and, in turn, abuses of 
 
considerations that did not warrant a downward departure). 
 63. See supra Part I.  The defendant’s role at sentencing is not that far 
removed from “the Guidelines conversation.”  See supra Part I.A.  The defendant’s 
conduct and criminal history produced a numerical range and the vast majority of 
imposed sentences followed that mathematical guidance.  Id. 
 64.  Compare United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D. Colo. 
2008) (“The criteria also point to individuated considerations: No one size fits all.  
The object of this balancing process is to achieve not a perfect or a mechanical 
sentence, but a condign one-one that is decent, appropriate and deserved under 
all attendant circumstances.”) (emphasis added), with United States v. Quigley, 30 
F.3d 135 (Table), Nos. 93-1429, 93-1520, 1994 WL 399569, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 
1994) (describing how the defendant, “who had no criminal history, [was] 
unfortunate enough to have committed a crime that lump[ed] him together with 
more dangerous and hardened criminals, [making him] suffer the consequences 
of one-size-fits-all sentencing”).  Courts often discussed “one-size-fits-all” when 
considering downward departures under Guidelines section 5K2.0, “Grounds for 
Departure,” because the Guidelines provision was too sweeping in the case at 
issue.  See, e.g., United States v. Marquez-Gallegos, 217 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5K2.0) (“Where the 
factor in issue is one already taken into account by the applicable Guideline and 
adjustments, departure from the Guideline is permissible only if that factor is 
present in a manner or degree unusual enough to distinguish the case from the 
‘heartland’ of cases covered by the Guideline.”). 
 65.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1.  The Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, provided for the 
development of modern guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal 
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.  See 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 1, pt. A, 
subpt. 1.  The Act delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and 
rationalize the federal sentencing process.  Id. 
 66.  The range of an applicable Guidelines sentence for Zone D, which 
addresses the most serious offenses, spans from twenty to thirty-three percent of 
the high end of the guideline range.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5, 
pt. A.  However, the percentage is only a fraction of the range between the 
statutory minimum and maximum.  See id. 
 67. See Koh, supra note 51, at 1120–21 (1992) (discussing a gamesmanship in 
gathering information for the court’s consideration at sentencing proceedings 
  
2011] THE PENDULUM IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 485 
prosecutorial discretion undermined the sentencing goals of 
uniformity and proportionality.68  The federal sentencing scheme 
was condemned as overly formulaic, inflexible, and harsh.69  A 
change to the mandatory Guidelines may have been unavoidable. 
1. Limited Judicial Role in the “Plea and Sentence” Federal System 
The district court’s limited role in most criminal cases bears on 
two issues applicable to this article.  First, the limited role explains 
why some judges may abhor policies or practices that rein in their 
discretion, such as mandatory sentencing schemes and binding 
plea agreements.70  Second, because judges are prohibited by 
statute from having a role in plea negotiations, the parties 
undertake a bit of a mystery in pursuing a binding plea agreement 
that must be accepted by the court without knowing the court’s 
standard for acceptance or personal feelings about determinative 
agreements.71  The limited judicial role also may best explain why 
the Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in Booker.72 
Federal district court judges have long presided over a 
predominantly criminal docket, wherein ninety-five percent of the 
cases are resolved by guilty plea.73  After the Supreme Court’s 
 
and in pre-sentencing reports); Notes, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for 
Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 837 (1968) (discussing how the information before 
the court at sentencing comes almost exclusively from prosecutors, “who cannot 
be expected to be disinterested”). 
 68. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting 
that because judges are prevented from departing from the Guidelines, discretion 
is transferred to prosecutors); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (discussing how the Guidelines allow for 
prosecutors’ “manipulation of . . . charge and sentencing”). 
 69. See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 37, 46 (2005) (criticizing sentencing schemes like the Guidelines 
that guide judges to impose sentences “calculated by means of mechanical scoring 
systems . . . rather than by looking closely at the circumstances of individual 
cases”). 
 70. See Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 407, 460–61 (2008). 
 71. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
 72. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 245 (2005). 
 73. See 2005 ANN. REP.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.D-4, at 245 (2006), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/AnnualReport/2005.pdf 
(reporting 77,339 convictions, with 74,024 resulting from guilty pleas).  “Although 
reliable statistical information is limited, one recent estimate indicated that guilty pleas 
account for the disposition of as many as 95% of all criminal cases.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 
Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974.  “The great majority of all defendants against whom 
indictments or informations are filed in the federal courts plead guilty.  Only a 
comparatively small number go to trial.”  Id. at Advisory Comm. Notes, 1966. 
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decision in Santabello,74 the government and the defense were 
encouraged to openly negotiate and contract for mutually 
favorable terms at the time of a guilty plea.75  Although federal 
criminal practice was a “plea and sentence” system, district court 
judges participated in plea discussions and enjoyed true discretion 
at sentencing. 
In the 1970s, Congress, after some debate,76 decided that in 
federal court, unlike prior practice and most state court systems, 
the judge would have no role in plea discussions.77  Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11 (Rule 11) covered the parameters of a 
guilty plea colloquy with the defendant and clearly delineated the 
court’s limited role in plea negotiations.78  Congress provided that 
 
 74. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
 75. See id. at 261–62 (“The plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing 
and if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way 
be made known.”). 
 76. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974 (“It has been stated 
that it is common practice for a judge to participate in plea discussions.”) (citing 
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT 
TRIAL 32–52, 78–104 (1966)); Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: 
Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 891, 905 
(1964); cf. ABA COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, INFORMAL OP. C-779 (1965) (“The judge, 
of course, should not be a party to any arrangements in advance for the 
determination of sentence whether as a result of a guilty plea or a finding of guilty 
based on proof.”).  
 77. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974 (citing ABA 
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3(a) (Approved Draft 1968)) 
(introducing subdivision (e)(1) prohibiting the court from participating in plea 
discussions); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding 
that trial judges should neither participate in plea bargaining nor entice 
defendants to plead guilty with promises of a lenient sentence). But see FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes, 2002 (citing United States v. Torres, 999 F.2d 
376, 378 (9th Cir. 1993)) (noting the practice and concluding that the presiding 
judge had not participated in a plea agreement that had resulted from discussions 
involving another judge and stating that “[t]he Committee considered whether to 
address the practice in some courts of using judges to facilitate plea agreements.”). 
 78. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in these 
discussions.”); see also Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 376 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1981)) (stating that “[a] 
judge who participates in plea bargaining ‘is no longer a judicial officer or a 
neutral arbiter.  Rather, he becomes or seems to become an advocate for the 
resolution he has suggested to the defendant.”); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. 
Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (discussing the “unequal positions 
of the judge and the accused”).  But see Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the 
Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges Should Be Able To Participate in Plea Discussions 3 
(John Marshall Law School, working paper series, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672442 (arguing that 
judicial participation in plea discussions would produce more reasonable plea 
agreements than those that begin with unnecessarily high initial offers from the 
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the court must accept or reject guilty pleas and negotiated plea 
agreements; yet, due to the imbalance of a lifetime-appointed 
federal judge relative to a criminal defendant, the court shall not 
be part of the discussion.79  Presiding over fewer criminal trials and 
disinvited from plea discussions, the district court served its most 
important function at sentencing.80   
Following the introduction of the Guidelines, federal court 
remained a plea and sentence practice.  District court judges still 
had no role in plea discussions.81  The mandatory Guidelines 
reduced sentencing to a ceremony and severely limited the court’s 
role in the phase in which it was most involved.  Specific provisions 
of the Guidelines82 and the mandatory scheme’s predictability 
further incentivized guilty pleas.83  Yet the central functions of 
federal sentencing were outsourced to the Commission for creating 
the Guidelines84 and to the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services for 
running the initial calculations.85   
 
government). 
 79. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 80. Many district courts delegate the ministerial duties of handling guilty 
pleas in federal courts.  Some still argue the need for a judicial role in plea 
bargaining.  See Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and 
Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2028–29 (2006) (coining most plea 
bargaining as “biased and coercive”).  It was the potential for judicial coercion that 
led Congress to carve the court out from its function in federal plea bargaining.  
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974. 
 81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 82. The Guidelines codified a preexisting principle in federal criminal 
practice: if a defendant pleaded guilty and spared the time and resources of a trial, 
then the system would treat him more favorable at sentencing.  See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 3E1.1 (rewarding the defendant who “clearly 
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” and further rewarding 
the defendant who “has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of 
his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea 
of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and 
permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently”). 
 83. “According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 94.1% of federal 
prosecutors’ cases resolved in 2009 ended with a conviction.”  Feds’ Conviction Rate 
Bad Sign For Blago, WLS-TV, Aug. 4, 2010, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story
?section=news/local&id=7593302 (last visited Dec. 19, 2010). 
 84. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2009). 
 85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(9), 995(a)(18) (2009) (directing the Commission 
to “monitor the performance of probation officers’” work with the Guidelines and 
to “devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing 
techniques for judicial and probation personnel” and others). 
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2. Prosecutorial Discretion 
The mandatory Guidelines caused several problems related to 
prosecutorial discretion.  First, the mandatory Guidelines 
significantly limited the federal prosecutor’s discretion at 
sentencing.86  Second, the Guidelines could not address the lack of 
uniformity in the few decisions that remained within the discretion 
of the prosecutor.87  Lastly, the mandatory sentencing scheme 
exacerbated abuses of prosecutorial discretion88 and, in turn, 
government discretion sometimes undermined the sentencing 
goals of uniformity and proportionality.89   
The mandatory Guidelines, along with DOJ protocol,90 limited 
 
 86. After indictment and plea or trial, the federal prosecutor is confined to 
the same narrow Guidelines range based upon the offense conduct charged and 
the criminal history of the defendant.  See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John 
Ashcroft on Dep’t Policy and Procedures Concerning Sentencing 
Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals to All Federal Prosecutors (July 28, 
2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft July 2003 Memo], available at http://www.nacdl.org
/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf (requiring 
prosecutors to recommend a sentence to the court within the Guidelines and to 
oppose all motions for downward departure filed by the defendant or by the court 
sua sponte). 
 87. See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: 
Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1 (2009) (discussing 
prosecutorial discretion as the central component in federal criminal practice, yet 
not subject to judicial review); cf. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 639 (advocating for 
binding plea agreement determinations to be matters within prosecutorial 
discretion).  
 88. The Guidelines treated all offense conduct mathematically, even if the 
charges arose from abuses of prosecutorial discretion.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001) (considering vindictive prosecution 
claims occurring after the defendant exercises his right to appeal).  
 89. See infra notes 102, 106 (describing instances when prosecutorial 
discretion served to negotiate the guidelines, as opposed to operate within them). 
 90. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86 (setting out the policies and 
procedures for sentencing recommendations, hearings, and appeals); 
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. James Comey on Dep’t Policies and Procedures 
Concerning Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors  (Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter 
Comey 2005 Memo], available at http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/~/media
/Files/Comey%20Memo%202005.ashx (echoing similar guidance); cf. 
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder on Dep’t Policy on Charging and 
Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Holder 2010 
Memo], available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/holdermemo.pdf 
(discussing rare cases in which sentences outside of the Guidelines may be 
appropriate); see also the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 
Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (directing the Sentencing Commission to review the grounds 
for downward departure); Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft on 
Dep’t Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and 
Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft 
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traditional prosecutorial discretion at sentencing.  Once the wheels 
of justice were set in motion upon charging, the defendant’s fate 
did not rest with the prosecutor.91  The Guidelines produced a 
narrow sentencing range and, like the judiciary, the prosecutor’s 
discretion was similarly confined.  The DOJ required that federal 
prosecutors mechanically argue for “guideline sentences” and 
defend against all other attempts by the defense or the judiciary to 
deviate.92   
The DOJ sought to regulate decisions that traditionally rested 
in the discretion of the prosecutor.93  In 2003, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft distributed a memorandum that standardized some 
prosecutorial discretion by requiring the government to argue for 
“guideline sentences.”94  The memorandum also required the 
government to oppose all defense motions for lower sentences95 
and report when district court judges imposed sentences below the 
 
September 2003 Memo], available at http://www.crimelynx.com
/ashchargememo.html (directing, in a section entitled “Sentence Bargaining,” 
that “[t]here are only two types of permissible sentence bargains. . . .  Sentences 
within the Sentencing Guidelines range . . . [and]   Departures”).  Attorney 
General Ashcroft stated, in the September 2003 Memo, “Congress has made clear 
its view that there have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing 
Guidelines, and it has instructed the Commission to take measures ‘to ensure that 
the incidence of downward departures [is] substantially reduced.’”  Ashcroft 
September 2003 Memo.     
 91.   See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the constitutional holding in Booker 
could have given greater discretion to the federal prosecutor, as opposed to the 
district court); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (discussing how 
the prosecutor through plea negotiations could determine which factors would be 
before the district court at sentencing); cf.  O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1414–17 
(defending the Guidelines’ structure as unlikely to allow abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion  to adversely affect its  goals of uniformity and proportionality). 
 92.   See infra notes 93–95 (describing how DOJ and then Attorney General 
John Ashcroft restricted discretion and called for standardized responses to 
defense and judicial activity in opposition). 
 93.   See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86 (telling all Department 
attorneys they must adhere to the Department’s policies and procedures for 
sentencing recommendations, hearings, and appeals); Comey 2005 Memo, supra 
note 90, at 1 (stating “we must take all steps necessary to ensure adherence to the 
Sentencing Guidelines”); Holder 2010 Memo, supra note 90, at 1.   
 94.   See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 2 (“Any sentencing 
recommendation made by the United States in a particular case must honestly 
reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and must be fully 
consistent with the Guidelines and applicable statutes and with the readily 
provable facts about the defendant’s history and conduct.”). 
 95.   See id. at 3; see also the PROTECT ACT, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. at 675 
(aiming at reducing the prevalence of downward departures from the Guidelines).  
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guideline range.96  The Department’s message was clear: the fewer 
incidents of prosecutorial discretion, and the greater deference to 
the Guidelines, the better.   
Partly because of the mandatory Guidelines, the government 
sometimes resorted to loopholes in the Guidelines to resolve cases.  
For example, some prosecutors treated statutory enhancements 
improperly as matters within their discretion.97  Federal prosecutors 
did not react uniformly in striking pre-indictment arrangements 
with defendants and witnesses, or when filing restated charges in 
conjunction with a plea agreement.98  U.S. Attorney’s offices 
throughout the country had very different standards when 
declining criminal prosecutions, deciding plea agreements, 
deciding whether to file a motion for downward departure for 
“substantial assistance” and, once filed, recommending a 
sentencing reduction to the court.99  When mandatory, the 
Guidelines invited impropriety and disparate treatment in these 
areas.100    
 
 
 96.   See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 3–4 (encouraging the 
opposition of defense motions for downward departure and government appeals 
of adverse decisions); ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 54, at 9-2:170(b)  
(authorizing appeals). 
 97.   See Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing the 
lack of uniformity in application of statutory enhancements).  Attorney General 
Ashcroft addressed the widely known practice of declining to seek “readily 
provable” statutory enhancements in conjunction with a guilty plea.  Id.  The 
Memo specifically cites two of the most common abuses of the time, the “filing of 
an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 or the filing of a charge under 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c), are sought in all appropriate cases.”  Id.       
 98.   Id. (discussing the lack of uniformity in “post-indictment reassessment” 
or the practice of refiling less serious charges in conjunction with a plea 
agreement).  In cases where post-indictment circumstances cause a prosecutor to 
determine in good faith that the most serious offense is not readily provable 
because of a change in the evidence or some other justifiable reason (e.g., the 
unavailability of a witness or the need to protect the identity of a witness until he 
testifies against a more significant defendant), the prosecutor may dismiss the 
charge(s) with the written or otherwise documented approval of an Assistant 
Attorney General, United States Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney.  Id. 
 99. See George C. Harris, supra note 60, at 9 (comparing so-called 
“cooperation agreements” to government bribery); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From 
Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor’s Expanding Power over 
Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 200 (1997) (“The 
prosecutor now is more of a concierge, directing which defendants may enter the 
household and which rooms they may visit.”). 
 100. See Gleeson, supra note 22, at 648–49 (discussing binding plea agreements 
that were below board so as to avoid the Guidelines unworkable policy statement 
in Section 6B1.2).   
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As it relates to this article, the mandatory Guidelines also 
affected the prosecutor’s discretion to entertain binding plea 
agreements in federal court.  In a 2008 law review article, Judge 
John Gleeson, while presiding in the Eastern District of New York, 
argued that the Guidelines curbed prosecutorial discretion in the 
area of binding plea agreements.101  There are several reasons why a 
prosecutor may want to enter into a binding plea agreement, as 
Congress intended under Rule 11, for a lower sentence than the 
judge may impose.102   
For example, agreeing to a shorter sentence may be 
appropriate when there is a risk of acquittal at trial, priorities lie 
with other cases and investigations, sparing the victim the 
experience of trial,103 or, as discussed below, a conviction and an 
admission of guilt are more important than a particular sentence.104  
The mandatory Guidelines instead dictated plea discussions, 
leaving little room for the government’s opinion about an appropriate 
sentence,105 much less a “milk of human kindness.”106    
Abuses of prosecutorial discretion, such as bringing the wrong 
case, targeting the wrong defendants, or bringing a case for the 
wrong reasons were similarly destined for a dispassionate, overly 
formulaic, and harsh result.107  The subset of criminal cases that 
most incensed judges at sentencing were actually abuses of 
prosecutorial discretion.108  Once the Guidelines neutered binding 
 
 101. Id. at 640–41 (stating that “the Commission has attempted to strip 
prosecutors of a power they have had for more than half a century”—the power to 
negotiate and enter into binding plea agreements). 
 102. Id. at 640. 
 103. Id.   
 104. See supra Part V.C (discussing the Enron prosecution of the three British 
bankers who pled guilty pursuant to binding plea agreements); see also Geraldine 
Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate 
Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (2003) (praising the Guidelines’ uniform and 
unbiased treatment of white collar crime cases). 
 105. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ protocol 
during the Guidelines era). 
 106. See Gleeson, supra note 22, at 640 (“Sometimes, believe it or not, 
prosecutors simply reveal the milk of human kindness and negotiate a lesser 
sentence because it seems fair in the circumstances.”). 
 107. The traditional and separate decisions to investigate, charge, offer a plea, 
accept an offer to plea, insist on specific terms of a plea agreement, dismiss, offer a 
lesser offense or lesser sentence (with or without cooperation), and negotiate a 
lesser charge or lesser sentence were combined into only a narrow set of actual 
decisions.  Once indicted, prosecutorial discretion, like judicial discretion, in a 
criminal case narrowed significantly under the Guidelines. 
 108. “Congress did not create the Sentencing Commission with an eye toward 
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plea agreements,109 it also encouraged sub rosa deals, fact-
bargaining, and improper pre-agreement ratification by the 
court.110  This stigma stays with Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements 
today and possibly poses the greatest challenge to implementing 
any of the proposals in Part VI of this article. 
3. Lack of Individualization at Sentencing 
Sentencing proceedings under the mandatory Guidelines 
reflected more computation than consideration or compassion.  
The Guidelines reduced sentencing to a mathematical exercise and 
left minimal room for advocacy or judgment.111  From the 
defendant’s perspective, it was not unusual for a defendant to first 
meet his or her sentencing judge on the day of sentencing.  
Expecting a speech, lecture, or modicum of human compassion, 
the defendant was forced to endure a painful recitation of 
applicable guideline provisions and calculations and, at last, a 
range of months representing the narrow window of his eventual 
sentence.   
Because the court was not permitted to consider many 
individual characteristics and life circumstances at sentencing,112 
the tone of the proceeding similarly steered elsewhere.  
Information about the person before the court at sentencing 
appeared in the presentence report and the court may have even 
“adopted” the information as its “factual findings”; yet, these 
matters were secondary to the math.  Instead of any true 
 
eradicating prosecutorial abuses . . .”  United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1408 
(1st Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996).  Many of the anecdotal accounts 
of the mandatory Guidelines’ constraint on the court at sentencing were actually 
cases that should not be in federal court, punishable as a felony, or were worthy of 
a downward departure not filed. 
 109. See infra Part III.B (discussing how binding plea agreements were 
“meaningless” under the mandatory Guidelines). 
 110. See Gleeson, supra note 22, at 642 n.10, 648–49 (discussing binding plea 
agreements that were sent underground by the Guidelines). 
 111. See supra note 62.  The Guideline range is structured as a fractional 
percentage of the high end of the range.  
 112. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, §§ 5H1.1–.16 (listing 
individual characteristics and circumstances that are not ordinarily relevant to the 
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 
range, such as: age; education and vocational skills; mental and emotional 
conditions; physical condition, including drug or alcohol dependence or abuse; 
gambling addiction; employment record; family ties and responsibilities; 
dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood; race, sex, national origin, 
creed, religion, and socioeconomic status; and lack of guidance as a youth). 
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compassion, sympathy, or guidance from the court, the sentencing 
proceeding was less about the defendant, his or her life, and other 
circumstances and more about the Guidelines and its calculations.   
III. MANDATORY GUIDELINES EFFECTIVELY REPLACED                        
BINDING PLEA AGREEMENTS 
A. Binding Plea Agreements Under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs plea 
agreements and the individual defendant’s rights when pleading 
guilty to a federal offense.113  Rule 11 forms the minimum 
requirements for the district court’s plea colloquy with a 
defendant.114  Congress, in promulgating Rule 11, included 
provisions encouraging specific terms in plea agreements.115  
Originally enacted as Rule 11(e),116 Rule 11(c) “establishe[d] a plea 
agreement procedure . . . [which] permits the parties to discuss 
disposing of a case without a trial and sets forth the type of 
agreements that the parties can reach concerning the disposition 
of the case.”117  Rule 11(e)(1), added with the 1974 amendments, 
and later changed to Rule11(c)(1),118 included language about plea 
agreement provisions for negotiated outcomes, including “specific 
 
 113. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see also 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 611.02 (3d ed. 2010) (describing how 
Rule 11 legitimizes and controls plea bargaining process); c.f. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20. 
 114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (addressing requirements a court “must” 
discuss with a defendant “[b]efore the court accepts a plea”). 
 115. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)–(C).  Also included in the legislation 
amending Rule 11 were provisions for negotiated, joint sentencing 
recommendations.  See id. at 11(c)(1)(B).  The district court, as with any 
recommendation from the parties, could accept or reject the recommendation.  
As it relates to this article, joint sentencing “recommendations” to the court under 
Rule 11(c)(1)(B) do not affect the predictability of sentencing because they are 
nonbinding.  The certainty of an outcome is no more defined when two parties, as 
opposed to one, recommend a result, yet the decision maker is free to ignore the 
recommendation.  For these reasons, this article focuses only on a renewed role 
for binding plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). 
 116. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. 
Law No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370, 372  (1975).  
 117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (1975). 
 118. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (1974) (“Subdivision (e) 
provides a plea agreement procedure designed to give recognition to the 
propriety of plea discussions; to bring the existence of a plea agreement out into 
the open in court; and to provide methods for court acceptance or rejection of a 
plea agreement.”). 
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sentences or sentencing ranges.”119   
Congress encouraged parties in a criminal case to negotiate 
and contract for a definitive sentence in Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which 
reads as follows: “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range 
is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular 
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or 
sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a recommendation 
or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea 
agreement).”120  The parenthetical further distinguishes the 
binding plea agreement from the joint recommendation plea 
agreement in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), which the court could consider or 
ignore, without recourse for the defendant.121 
The procedural hurdle to the binding plea agreement was, 
and still is, the sentencing judge’s acceptance of the agreement.122  
The court accepts a binding plea agreement in a separate, and 
often later, act from accepting the guilty plea.123  Accepting a guilty 
plea involves exploring the factual basis for the conviction, whereas 
accepting a binding plea agreement involves more of a value 
judgment about the deal.124  
 
 119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (stating that a plea agreement may set forth 
“a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, 
or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or 
sentencing factor does or does not apply”); see also United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d 
1283, 1283 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing that parties stipulated to a particular 
sentencing range, rather than a specific sentence, in a binding plea agreement). 
 120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 121. See id. 
 122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (1975).  The Supreme Court 
amendments to Rule 11(e) establish a plea agreement procedure.  This procedure 
permits the parties to discuss disposing of a case without a trial and sets forth the 
type of agreements that the parties can reach concerning the disposition of the 
case.  The procedure is not mandatory; a court is free not to permit the parties to 
present plea agreements to it.  Id.  The government and the defendant are the 
parties to the plea agreement.  The court’s role is not to modify but only to accept 
or reject.  Once the court accepts a plea agreement, however, it too is bound by 
the terms.  See Perez v. State, 866 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), transfer 
denied, (July 25, 2007). 
 123.  See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674 (1997) (holding that 
“[g]uilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the 
acceptance of the two can be separated in time”).  The Commentary to section 
6B1.2 of the Guidelines, in fact, encouraged the judiciary to defer acceptance of a 
binding plea agreement until after U.S. Probation had prepared its presentence 
report.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra  note 1, § 6B1.2 cmt. 
 124. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) 
(describing the court’s discretion to accept or reject a binding plea agreement).  
See also infra note 219 (discussing the appellate courts’ “reasonableness” review); 
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The standard for the district court’s acceptance of a binding 
plea agreement, importantly, has dictated its role in federal 
criminal practice.125  Rule 11 and its advisory notes are silent as to 
the standard for accepting binding plea agreements.126  Before the 
Guidelines, district courts accepted binding plea agreements if the 
“specific sentence” comported with the district judge’s own sense of 
a just and fair result.127  In essence, the parties enjoyed the same 
discretion to contract for an appropriate sentence as the judge had 
to impose one.128 
 
Part VI (proposing a new standard for judicial acceptance of binding plea 
agreements that mirrors the procedural and substantive components of the 
appellate courts “reasonableness” review of imposed sentences). 
 125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (describing the court’s discretion to 
accept or reject a binding plea agreement).  But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) 
(prohibiting the court from accepting a binding plea agreement without 
confirming that the plea has a factual basis); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, supra note 117. 
Rule 11(e) established a plea agreement procedure, which permits the parties to 
discuss “disposing of a case without a trial and sets forth the type of agreements 
that the parties can reach concerning the disposition of the case.  The procedure 
is not mandatory; a court is free not to permit the parties to present plea 
agreements to it.”  Id. 
 126. Rule 11(e), later revised to Rule 11(c), was silent about the standard for 
the court to apply when deciding to accept a binding plea agreement.  See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (“Amendments have been made to Rule 
11(e)(1)(B) and (C) [later revised to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) and (C)] to reflect the 
impact of the Sentencing Guidelines on guilty pleas.  Although Rule 11 is 
generally silent on the subject, it has become clear that the courts have struggled 
with the subject of guideline sentencing vis a vis plea agreements . . . .”).  Under 
Rule 11(e)(3), later revised to Rule 11(c)(4), the rule states that, “[i]f the court 
accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that to the extent the 
plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed 
disposition will be included in the judgment.”  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4).   
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(finding acceptance or rejection of any Rule 11 plea agreement reviewed for abuse 
of discretion).  Cases decided during the Guidelines era disregarded the 
Guidelines’ policy statement in section 6B1.2 and its commentary and applied a 
common sense definition of “justifiable reasons” for a binding plea agreement.  
See, e.g., United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676 (1997) (stating that the “fair and 
just reason” applies to 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement acceptance); United States v. 
Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the parties’ agreement 
to a sentence outside of the Guidelines, but without clear departure authority, was 
“justifiable”); United States v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (D. Neb. 2005) 
(accepting an 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, even where the sentence fell outside 
of the Guideline range, when premised upon “justifiable reasons”). 
 128. Courts have long recognized that plea agreements are subject to the law 
of contracts, particularly for standards of interpretation.  See United States v. 
Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that “[p]lea bargaining . . . 
though a matter of criminal jurisprudence, is subject to contract-law standards”); 
see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 18. 
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B. Binding Plea Agreements Meaningless Under the Guidelines  
Ironically, it was a Guidelines policy statement and its 
commentary about judicial acceptance of the binding plea 
agreements that chilled use of binding plea agreements during the 
Guidelines era,129 and still do today.130  The Guidelines 
recommended that the court defer acceptance of the binding plea 
agreement until the court has reviewed the pre-sentence report.131  
After more than a decade and without any need to do so, the 
Commission elected to set forth a new, self-interested standard for 
judicial acceptance of binding plea agreements.132  Section 6B1.2(c) 
of the Guidelines stated, beginning in 1987, that with a binding 
plea agreement “the court may accept the agreement if the court is 
satisfied either that: . . . the agreed sentence is within the 
applicable guideline range; or . . . the agreed sentence departs 
from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons . . . .”133 
In an early 1989 amendment to the Commentary for Section 
6B1.2 and again without any need to do so, the Commission 
unilaterally defined “justifiable reasons.”134  The Guidelines stated 
that 
the court should accept a . . . specific sentence only if the 
court is satisfied either that such sentence is . . . within the 
applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence 
departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable 
 
 129. When promulgated, Rule 11(e)(1), later revised to Rule 11(c)(1), 
explicitly permitted plea agreements between the government and a defendant 
and, according to the Second Circuit, “specifically provide[d] for possible 
concessions that the government may make in a plea agreement, in addition to 
reduction of the charge to a lesser or related offense.”  United States v. Burruezo, 
704 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES 
(1976)) (emphasis added). 
 130. See infra Part VI (advocating for Congress to amend Rule 11 or the 
Commission to redraft the applicable Guidelines’ policy statements). 
 131. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, § 6B1.1(c) cmt.  
 132. See Id.; see also Gleeson, supra note 22, at 645–46 (calling the policy 
statement governing the acceptance of binding plea agreements a “defect” and 
criticizing the Commission’s implementation of important change through its 
commentary).  
 133. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 6B1.2(c) (2009), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009_guidelines/Manual/GL2009.pdf (emphasis 
added).  The policy statement provided the flexibility for parties to enter into 
meaningful plea agreements as Congress intended under Rule 11(c); it allowed 
parties to agree to, and judges to accept, a favorable sentence for a defendant 
based upon “justifiable reasons” in subsection (2) and without regard for the 
“applicable guideline range” in subsection (1).  Id. 
 134. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, § 6B1.2 cmt.   
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reasons (i.e., that such departure is authorized by 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b) [the mandatory Guidelines]).135   
The Commentary continued by stating that “the court may not 
depart below the applicable guideline range merely because of the 
defendant’s decision to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a 
plea agreement . . . .”136   
In sum, according to the Guidelines’ policy statement, the 
court shall only accept binding plea agreements if the court could 
have imposed the specific sentence in its limited discretion.137  Some 
courts did not consider this policy statement in Section 6B1.2 as 
mandatory or binding.138 
The DOJ139 also held back the important function of binding 
plea agreements and chilled prosecutors from using them for more 
than twenty years.140  Through its alignment and allegiance to the 
 
 135. Id. (emphasis added).  The comment continued to explain that “those 
reasons are specifically set forth in writing in the statement of reasons or the 
judgment and commitment order.  As set forth in subsection (d) of § 5K2.0 
(Grounds for Departure), however, the court may not depart below the applicable 
guideline range merely because of the defendant’s decision to plead guilty to the 
offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense.”  Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. See id.; see also supra notes 63–65 (discussing the district court’s narrow 
departure authority); supra notes 88–94 (discussing prosecutorial discretion and 
departures from sentences under the Guidelines); infra notes 139–41 (discussing 
the PROTECT Act and DOJ protocol calling for fewer downward departures and 
fewer instances of below-Guidelines sentences).  
 138. See United States v. Goodall, 236 F.3d 700, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Plea 
agreements can retain their authority to bind the government, the defendant and 
the district court even when they provide for sentences that depart from the 
prescriptions of the guidelines.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Gilchrist, 130 
F.3d 1131, 1134 (3d Cir. 1997) (“An 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, once accepted, 
binds the district court notwithstanding departures from the applicable 
guidelines.”).  
 139. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 675 
(2003); Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90.  In a memorandum 
following Congress’s passage of the PROTECT Act and in a section entitled 
“Sentence Bargaining,” Attorney General Ashcroft directed federal prosecutors 
that sentences may only be reduced via the sentencing guidelines range or 
departures.  See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 1.  The Department of 
Justice echoed the Guidelines’ policy statements and further discouraged binding 
plea agreements in federal practice.  See supra Part II.C (discussing DOJ protocol 
and the guidance from the Attorney Generals under the Guidelines).  In sum, 
DOJ functionally prohibited federal prosecutors from contracting for a sentence 
not called for by the Guidelines.  Id. 
 140. See Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90.  Attorney General 
Ashcroft stated, 
[F]ederal prosecutors must not request or accede to a downward 
departure except in the limited circumstances specified in this 
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Guidelines, the DOJ implicitly prohibited federal prosecutors from 
agreeing to specific sentences below the Guidelines.141  Federal 
prosecutors, pursuant to the Attorney General’s memoranda, were 
to argue for a Guidelines sentence, oppose motions for a below-
Guidelines sentence, and report instances when a court imposed a 
below-Guidelines sentence.142  To enter into a binding plea 
agreement as Congress intended under Rule 11, one that offers the 
defendant a lower sentence, the prosecutor would have to 
contravene the Attorney General’s directive and, if the agreement 
was accepted, report the judge. 
Some district courts disfavored binding plea agreements 
during the mandatory Guidelines era, even as seldom as they were 
used.143  The few binding agreements that surfaced during the 
mandatory Guidelines era derived from one of the following 
interpretations: Rule 11 trumps the Guidelines’ policy 
statements;144 Rule 11 provides for the nonapplicability of 
 
memorandum and with authorization from an Assistant Attorney 
General, United States Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney.  
Likewise, except in such circumstances and with such authorization, 
prosecutors may not simply stand silent when a downward departure 
motion is made by the defendant.  Id.  
 141. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 3.  Attorney General 
Ashcroft reiterated DOJ’s protocol to combat all downward departure motions 
and addressed binding plea agreements specifically, “if the agreement is for a 
specific sentence under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the agreement must not vitiate relevant 
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.”  Id. 
 142. Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90.   
 143. See, e.g., United States v. Seidman, 483 F. Supp 156, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1980) 
(“At the outset, the Court would note that it never will accept a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) 
type plea agreement.  It is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of 
sentence that should be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or 
she has been adjudged guilty.”); cf. United States v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d 844, 
845 (D. Neb. 2005) (“When such a plea agreement smells too much like cow 
manure siphoned from a feedlot after a swampy, summer rain, judges should not 
pretend the odor is lilac.  On the other hand, if the plea agreement stinks, but the 
stench is more like kitty litter than cow manure, a judge should hold his or her 
nose and move on.  The trick is to discern the difference.”).  
 144. Cases decided during the Guidelines era disregarded the Guidelines’ 
policy statement in Section 6B1.2 and its commentary and applied a commonsense 
definition of “justifiable reasons” for a binding plea agreement.  See, e.g., Coney, 390 
F. Supp. 2d at 850 (accepting an 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, even where the 
sentence fell outside of the Guidelines range, when premised upon “justifiable 
reasons”); United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 344–347 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the parties’ agreement to a sentence outside of the Guidelines, but 
without clear departure authority, was “justifiable”); United States v. Hyde, 520 
U.S. 670, 676 (1997) (“fair and just reason” applies to 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement 
acceptance). 
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Guidelines’ provisions, including Section 6B1.2 and its 
commentary, which discouraged binding plea agreements;145 or the 
sentiment that with the parties and court in agreement as to an 
appropriate sentence, there was no one left to challenge a 
downward deviation from the Guidelines range.   
IV. THE GAME CHANGER OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER 
Prior to 2005, the mandatory Guidelines constrained federal 
district courts’ sentencing discretion for nearly twenty years.146  
Booker rendered the Guidelines “advisory” and restored discretion 
to the trial courts at sentencing.147  District courts now sentence 
individual defendants according to policy statements, a 
“consultation” of the Guidelines, and generalized notions of 
fairness, consistency, and the interests of justice.148  The effect of 
the Court’s remedy in Booker was unrelated to the constitutional 
challenge upon which review was granted.149  The effect of Booker, 
however, is progressive and dramatic. 
A. The Gradual Constitutional Challenge to Judicial Fact Finding at 
Sentencing 
For all of the criticism of the Guidelines as mandatory, overly 
formulaic, or impersonal, it was a Sixth Amendment challenge to a 
judge’s findings of sentencing enhancements by a lesser standard 
of proof that rendered the Guidelines “advisory” in Booker.150  The 
line of cases began in the 1990s and surfaced every few years, 
causing some havoc in federal practice.151  The constitutional 
 
 145. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (stating that the parties may agree to the 
nonapplicability of Guidelines’ provisions).  While there is no reported case that 
states that the binding plea agreement included an agreement about the 
nonapplicability of the policy statement about accepting a binding plea agreement 
in Section 6B1.2, it is feasible.  
 146. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 246–47; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the incongruent 
remedy in Booker and how the constitutional violations could have been entrusted 
to prosecutorial discretion). 
 149. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the incongruent remedy in Booker).  
 150. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46; see also James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, 
Construction and Application of Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury—Supreme Court 
Cases, 6 A.L.R. FED. 2D 213 (2005). 
 151. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 242 (1999) (discussing the 
Sixth Amendment concerns raised in McMillan as it “broached the potential 
constitutional significance of factfinding that raised the sentencing ceiling”); 
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challenge did not relate to the substance of the mandatory 
Guidelines or its effect on a particular class of defendants.152  
Instead, the challenge concerned the process153 employed by district 
court judges in making findings of fact in accordance with the 
Commission’s formula.154  The eventual remedy in Booker, as 
discussed below, bears no relation to these procedural 
challenges.155   
  The constitutional challenge and analysis turned on 
determinations of elements versus “sentencing factors.”156  An 
indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges 
and the government must then prove each element beyond a 
 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment 
right to jury determination of all “ultimate facts concerning the offense 
committed”); cf. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–47 (1998) 
(distinguishing between elements of crimes and sentencing factors). 
 152. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the gradual constitutional challenge that 
culminated in the Court’s decision in Booker and the remedy of the “advisory 
Guidelines”). 
 153. See infra Part VI.A.  In cases that went to trial during the mandatory 
Guidelines era, juries in most federal criminal trials were asked to return verdicts 
of guilt based upon the government’s proof of the elements of a crime only.  They 
typically did not, at the time of the verdict using the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, render additional findings related to aggregating factors related to the 
offense, conduct, or the defendant’s background.  The line of cases in the 
developing constitutional challenge to this process that culminated with Booker 
addressed the right to have the jury decide, in addition to elements, the applicable 
sentencing enhancements in the Guidelines using the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard in criminal cases.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 154. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1.  See supra Part II (discussing the 
complex formula and mathematical complexity of the Guidelines).  In practice, 
the district court judge would enter a finding related to these enhancements at 
sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard.  For example, in a 
fraud case that went to trial, the government may have proved and the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on wire fraud, a scheme to defraud carried out 
through the use of an interstate wire.  For illustration, the offense of conviction 
carries with it applicable Guidelines enhancements based upon the amount of 
money at issue in the fraud and the number of victims impacted.  The government 
was not required to and may not have presented evidence of these potential 
enhancements at trial.  The district judge at sentencing would then decide 
whether a Guidelines enhancement applied, whether presented at trial or not, 
using a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
 155. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246–47.  See infra Part IV.B (discussing the incongruent 
remedy in Booker). 
 156. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79 (among the first cases in which the Court used 
“sentencing factor” to refer to a fact that was not found by the jury but could affect 
the sentence imposed by the judge); see also Buchwalter, supra note 150, § 14 
(discussing cases where no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial held for 
“sentencing factors”). 
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reasonable doubt in a criminal case.157  Conversely, the government 
need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of a 
defendant who is convicted of the charged crime, and it need not 
present evidence at trial in support of the enhancement.158  
Congress, over time, began to clearly establish its legislative intent 
to promulgate sentencing factors instead of additional elements 
and new crimes.159  The Supreme Court devoted several cases 
leading up to Booker sorting out elements from sentencing factors 
and the process of increasing a defendant’s exposure for the first 
time at sentencing.160  
In 1998, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,161 the Court 
reiterated Congress’s power to draft sentencing factors and the 
district court’s ability to enhance a defendant’s sentence based 
upon a sentencing factor.162  In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held 
that a sentencing factor based upon the defendant’s recidivism in 
an illegal reentry prosecution was a penalty provision that 
authorized an enhanced sentence.163  Because it did not create a 
separate crime, the government was not required to allege the 
earlier conviction in the indictment or prove it at trial beyond a 
reasonable doubt.164   
 
 157. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974). 
 158. United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (“An 
indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges.” (citing 
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 
(1994) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the 
legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of 
statute.” (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))); McMillan, 
477 U.S. at 84–91 (holding that indictments need not set forth sentencing factors, 
as the question of sentencing factors versus crime elements are normally a matter 
for Congress). 
 159. Staples, 511 U.S. at 604.  But see McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84–91 (setting limits 
of Congress’s power to determine elements versus sentencing factors). 
 160. See Buchwalter, supra, note 150 (compiling and distinguishing the Court’s 
cases related to judicial fact-finding and the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to a jury trial). 
 161. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
 162. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228 (“Within limits, the question of 
[sentencing factors versus elements of crimes] is normally a matter for Congress.” 
(citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84–91)); see also Staples, 511 U.S. at 604 (definition of 
a criminal offense entrusted to the legislature, “particularly in the case of federal 
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute” (quoting Liparota v. United States, 
471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))). 
 163. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226–27. 
 164. Id. at 226 (“[I]f the provision simply authorizes an enhanced sentence 
when an offender also has an earlier conviction, then the indictment need not 
mention that fact, for the fact of an earlier conviction is not an element of the 
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In Jones v. United States165 in 1999, the Court reached the exact 
opposite result in analyzing the enhancements related to 
aggravating circumstances within the offense conduct.166  The Jones 
court again distinguished between elements of the offense that 
must be alleged in the indictment and proved at trial, as compared 
to “sentencing factors” which could be first addressed at 
sentencing.167  The Court’s analysis focused on the statute at issue, 
the notice afforded to a defendant by the offense charged in the 
indictment, and the maximum punishment for the offense.168  In 
Jones, the Court held that the federal carjacking statute set forth not 
sentencing factors, but three separate offenses with additional 
elements that must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.169 
Next, in Apprendi v. New Jersey170 in 2000, the Court considered 
a sentencing factor that enhanced, or could potentially enhance, a 
defendant’s sentence above the maximum punishment of the 
offense charged in the indictment and proved at trial.171  The 
government indicted Apprendi in New Jersey state court for a gun 
violation that carried a five-to-ten year maximum punishment.172  
After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to 
enhance the sentence under the state’s hate crime statute, and the 
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the shooting 
was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year 
term on the firearms count.173  By contrast, in Almendarez-Torres, the 
sentencing factor of recidivism increased the potential sentence for 
the defendant, but the resulting enhanced sentence remained 
 
present crime.”).  
 165. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 166. Id. at 235 (“Here, [as opposed to Almendarez-Torres], the search for 
comparable examples more readily suggests that Congress had separate and 
aggravated offenses in mind when it employed the scheme of [the relevant 
statutes].”). 
 167. Id. at 232 (“Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of 
an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be 
charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (referencing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
117 (1974)); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10 (1995))). 
 168. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–31. 
 169. Id. at 231–32. 
 170. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 171. Id. at 468–69. 
 172. Id. at 469–71. 
 173. Id. at 470–71. 
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below the statutory maximum for illegal reentry.174  In Apprendi, the 
Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction (the 
Almendarez-Torres exception), must be submitted to a jury and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.175    
On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v. 
Washington,176 invalidating a sentence imposed under the State of 
Washington’s mandatory sentencing guideline system.  The 
Supreme Court held that the Washington Guidelines violated the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.177  The 
government requested Blakely receive a standard-range sentence 
under a plea agreement, but the judge imposed a harsher 
punishment based on an enhancement not presented in the 
charging papers yet found by the court at sentencing.178  In Blakely, 
the Court correctly interpreted the rule in Apprendi to define 
“maximum punishment” as the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose solely on the elements of the offense found by the jury, not 
as the maximum sentence based on additional findings used at the 
sentencing stage to increase the maximum punishment.179  
The Court in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely struck down the 
higher sentence imposed by the trial court and classified the 
enhancement at issue as an element that must have been proved at 
 
 174. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1998). 
 175. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000) (distinguishing 
Almendarez-Torres on the basis that recidivism “does not relate to the commission of 
the offense” itself). 
 176. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  
 177. Id. at 313–14. 
 178. Id. at 300. 
 179. Compare id. at 303–04 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes 
is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 
(2002))), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83 (“The historic link between verdict and 
judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the 
limits of the legal penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme 
that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the 
criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if 
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.”).  See also 
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 563 (2002) (“Any ‘fact that . . . exposes the 
criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if 
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone’ . . . would have 
been, under the prevailing historical practice, an element of an aggravated 
offense.” (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483)). 
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trial.180  The Supreme Court did not address the Guidelines in these 
cases and did not mention the mandatory nature of the sentencing 
scheme in effect at the time.  In Apprendi and Blakely, the Supreme 
Court considered state sentences imposed by state judges based 
upon specific state statutes.181  In Jones, the Court analyzed 
aggravating factors in a federal statute, and the Guidelines again 
were not at issue.182  More at issue in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely 
were concerns for unfair surprise by the government and lack of 
notice to the defendant.183  Again, the constitutional challenge to 
sentencing enhancements and sliding maximum punishments in 
these cases did not implicate the Guidelines or otherwise relate to 
section 3553(b), which made the Guidelines mandatory in federal 
court.184   
Although the Court reserved opinion on the Guidelines, 
Blakely impacted federal practice immediately.185  Following Blakely, 
district and circuit courts voiced varying opinions on the 
implication of the decision for federal sentencing.186  Federal 
criminal practice after Blakely varied widely, and some courts, eager 
 
 180. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227, 227 (1999).  
 181. See Kathleen H. Morkes, Where Are We Going, Where Did We Come From: Why 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Were Invalidated and the Consequences for State 
Sentencing Schemes, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 249, 275–279 (2006) (describing how states 
had to reform their state sentencing regimes to conform with Blakely). 
 182. Jones, 526 U.S. at 227. 
 183. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.  
See generally Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a “Crime” the Government Did Not Prove: 
Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing 
Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1998) 
(discussing the constitutional due process issues presented by sentencing 
enhancements). 
 184. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; Jones, 526 U.S. at 227. 
 185. See United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558, 566 (3d Cir. 2006); United States 
v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Guevara, 408 F.3d 
252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Lopez-Zamora, 392 F.3d 1087, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 418 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mendoza-Mesa, 384 F.3d 951, 953 n.2 
(8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1181 (2005); United States v. Monsalve, 388 F.3d 
71, 72 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Smith, 393 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 186. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Train Wreck?  Or Can the Federal 
Sentencing System be Saved?  A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 217, 219 (2004) (“Blakely has created a ghastly mess, bringing the 
federal criminal justice system to a virtual halt and putting a number of state 
systems in disarray.” (citations omitted)); Stephanie Gosnell, Hurricane Blakely and 
the Calm After the Storm Found in Booker, 58 ARK. L. REV. 449, 464–69 (2005) 
(discussing the confusion among state courts after the decision in Blakely). 
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to be freed from the mandatory scheme’s reign, began to disregard 
the Guidelines in federal sentencing proceedings.187  Federal 
defendants contributed to the discord by pleading guilty to crimes, 
yet refusing to admit to applicable enhancements.  The confusion, 
disarray, and gamesmanship led to the Court taking up review of 
the Guidelines only six months later in Booker, as well as another 
case presenting similar issues, United States v. Fanfan.188 
On January 12, 2005, a split majority of the Supreme Court 
decided Booker and applied Blakely to the mandatory sentencing 
scheme under the Guidelines.189  In Booker, a narcotics prosecution, 
the Court reviewed the government’s appeal after the Seventh 
Circuit, relying on Blakely, reversed a sentencing enhancement 
under the Guidelines that the judge applied at sentencing.190  The 
enhancement increased Booker’s sentence because of an 
additional amount of drugs that, while not in the indictment nor 
presented at trial, was attributable to him as “relevant conduct” 
under the Guidelines.191  The district court sentenced Booker to 
thirty years, below the maximum punishment in his case from its 
inception, life imprisonment.192 
The first majority opinion in Booker, although addressing the 
Sixth Amendment violation and extending the Almendarez-Torres 
rule to Guideline enhancements, foreshadowed the ultimate 
remedy adopted by the Court.193  “If the Guidelines as currently 
written could be read as merely advisory provisions that 
recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular 
sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not 
implicate the Sixth Amendment.”194  In Booker, the Supreme Court 
struggled for a remedy to the Sixth Amendment violation that 
“maintain[s] a strong connection between the sentence imposed 
and the offender’s real conduct—a connection important to the 
increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its 
Guidelines system to achieve.”195  The Court linked the sentencing 
 
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 228–29 (2005) (describing 
the lower court’s decision to ignore the federal Guidelines). 
 188. Id. at 229 (consolidating Fanfan and Booker on appeal).   
 189. Id. at 226. 
 190. Id. at 227. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 244. 
 194. Id. at 233. 
 195. Id. at 246. 
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goal of uniformity with the necessary remedy to the Sixth 
Amendment violation related to district court judges finding 
guideline enhancements.196  
Unlike in Blakely, under the mandatory Guidelines, Booker 
long knew about his offense’s maximum punishment of life, the 
additional drugs forming the basis of his enhancement at 
sentencing, and his applicable sentencing range of thirty years to 
life.197  The lack of unfair surprise and the notice to the defendant 
distinguishes Booker from its progeny.  Instead, after Blakely, some 
Justices on the Court had the mandatory Guidelines in their 
sight.198    
B. Incongruent Remedy in Booker 
When the Court confronted the question of a remedy, a 
different majority weighed two options.  The first “would engraft 
onto the existing system today’s Sixth Amendment ‘jury trial’ 
requirement.”199  The second, as previewed by the first majority in 
discussing the constitutional violation, would maintain the 
mandatory Guidelines and its judicial findings, yet, as a final 
matter, reduce the resulting range to a mere advisory factor that 
the court may consider.200  The second majority observed that it was 
not possible to “maintain the judicial factfinding that Congress 
thought would underpin the mandatory Guidelines system” after 
 
 196. Id. at 263. 
 197. Id. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike the Washington state 
system at issue in Blakely, the federal system in Booker provides a defendant with no 
guarantee that the jury’s finding of factual elements will result in a sentence lower 
than the statutory maximum.  Rather, the statutes put a potential federal 
defendant on notice that a judge conceivably might sentence him anywhere within 
the range provided by statute—regardless of the applicable Guidelines range); see 
also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995) (“We thus made clear that use 
of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a 
separate crime within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute 
punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”); Comment, Sixth Amendment—State Sentencing Guidelines, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 333, 339–40 (2004) (stating that departure provisions indicate that the cases 
in which courts should depart are narrow, but without limiting judicial 
interpretation, departure remains possible in every case, suggesting that an 
increased sentence is never above “the maximum [a judge] may impose without 
any additional findings.” (citing Blakely, 524 U.S. 296, 302 (2004))).  
 198. See Douglas B. Bloom, United States v. Booker and United States v. 
Fanfan: The Tireless March of Apprendi and the Intracourt Battle to Save Sentencing 
Reform, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 542 (2005). 
 199. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246. 
 200. Id. at 246–47. 
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the first majority found judicial findings of applicable 
enhancements.201   
After the Court’s decision six months earlier in Blakely, some 
district courts already required the government to present and 
juries to find applicable guideline enhancements using the beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard.202  In other words, in some 
jurisdictions, the government was already doing what the Court 
considered “impossible” in Booker.  In most instances, jury 
factfinding of sentencing enhancements in the Guidelines was 
possible.   
Jury factfinding did not alter the government’s proof 
significantly in most cases.  In some other cases, if a defendant 
admitted to the elements of the crime, but not the enhancement, 
then the process was complicated and lengthened by requiring 
separate phases of a trial, including on just the enhancement as 
opposed to the elements of the crime.203  Arguably, the most 
complicating feature of judicial factfinding of sentencing factors 
lies in the careful construction of a special verdict form and 
additional jury instructions, explaining elements, deciding guilt, 
and thereafter finding sentencing factors.204 
Not discussed in Booker was another option: prosecutors could 
resolve some of the issues associated with jury factfinding within 
their discretion.  For example, following a guilty plea to the 
elements alone, the prosecutor would in some cases decide not to 
pursue quantitatively minor enhancements.  In other cases, the 
enhancement may be the important determining factor and worthy 
of a jury trial.  Prosecutorial discretion could allow a jury 
factfinding system to work with a mandatory sentencing scheme.  It 
is unknown, however, the effect of such discretion on the 
sentencing goals of uniformity and proportionality or the corollary 
notion of predictability for the defendant.    
 
 
 
 201. Id. at 246. 
 202. See supra note 222 (citing post-Blakely cases). 
 203. See, e.g., Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 215 (2006) (deciding a 
post-Blakely, pre-Booker trial where prosecutors submitted “special verdict forms” to 
the jury so that it may decide sentencing factors in the case beyond a reasonable 
doubt).  Federal criminal practice has a similar process with asset forfeiture 
allegations and death penalty considerations.   
 204. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 
677–78 (2005) (discussing the constitutional holding and the Court’s remedy). 
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Nevertheless, the second majority, without discussing the post-
Blakely practice or the true viability of other remedies for the 
constitutional violation, concluded that the process of jury 
factfinding under the Guidelines was impracticable, unsustainable, 
and inefficient.205  The second majority opted to sever and excise 
Section 3553(b), which required district courts to apply the 
Guidelines, and the related standard of review section, Section 
3742(e), which applies only in a mandatory federal scheme.206  The 
result was that the Guidelines, after almost twenty years of 
mandatory application at federal sentencing, were rendered 
"effectively advisory."207   
C. The Post-Booker Effect 
The sea change that resulted from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Booker seemingly improved federal 
sentencing for the judiciary, the prosecution, and the defense.  
Federal district court judges enjoy true discretion at sentencing 
once again.208  After several years of “advisory Guidelines,” courts 
have exercised that discretion decidedly in favor of the criminal 
defendant imposing lower sentences than were called for when the 
Guidelines were mandatory.209  Booker even liberated some federal 
prosecutors from a rigid aspect of federal criminal justice.210   
The Booker court further devoted its attention to the process of 
federal sentencing in the wake of its remedy.211  The Court 
instructed that “[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the 
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into 
account when sentencing.”212  This would mean that the district 
courts still set sentencing hearings with ample time for the 
 
 205. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44. 
 206. Id. at 245–46. 
 207. Id. at 246. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED 
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING vii (2006) (presenting the finding that 
“[t]he rate of government-sponsored, below-range sentences has increased slightly 
after Booker, . . . [including] substantial assistance[,] . . . . Early Disposition 
Program departures . . . and other government-sponsored downward departures”), 
with supra notes 88–92, 135–37 (discussing DOJ protocol and the PROTECT Act 
aimed at defending the Guidelines and reducing the incidence of below-
Guidelines sentences).  
 211. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44. 
 212. Id. at 264. 
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preparation of a presentence report (PSR) and full Guidelines 
analysis and calculations.  The district court would still decide 
guideline enhancements and reductions and arrive at the 
applicable guideline range, as it did when the Guidelines were 
mandatory.  The trial court still decides motions for departure 
from the applicable guideline range, yet it is not required to value 
the departure if granted.   
Only after the familiar calculations and judicial findings does 
the sentencing court now “tailor the sentence in light of other 
statutory concerns.”213  Congress previously set forth seven “factors 
to be considered” in § 3553(a) of Title 18, United States Code.214  
The factors are sufficiently broad to justify any reasonable variance, 
and almost any variance from the Guidelines range with or without 
a viable ground for departure.  They include the “nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant”; the “need for the sentence . . . to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; . . . afford adequate 
deterrence; . . . [and] protect the public.”215  The court must also 
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct.”216  The sentencing court, after Booker, must 
consider the factors in § 3553(a), the applicable Guidelines 
calculations, and departure provisions and policy statements on the 
record as justification for the sentence to be imposed.  However, 
after navigating the procedural hurdles and making a record of the 
panoply of “sentencing considerations,” the district court judge is 
free in most cases to impose a sentence from probation to the 
statutory maximum.   
 
 
 213. Id. at 245. 
 214. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1–7) (2009).  Section 3553(a) factors include the 
following: (1) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the 
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant 
as set forth in the Guidelines; (2) any pertinent policy statement issued by the 
Sentencing Commission; (3) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 
disparities; (4) the need to provide restitution to victims; and (5) the requirement 
to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect 
for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the 
public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training and medical care.  Id. 
 215. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2009). 
 216. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60. 
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Upon exercising the de novo standard of review called for in 
the statute, the Supreme Court directed courts of appeal to “review 
sentencing decisions for unreasonableness.”217  The defendant may 
challenge and the appellate courts may review the imposed 
sentence under a “reasonableness” standard.218  Reasonableness, 
the new standard of appellate review,219 has taken some time to 
formulate.220  First, the appellate court’s reasonableness review will 
enjoy abuse of discretion-type deference, regardless of the imposed 
sentences’ relation to a Guideline sentence.221  Second, and most 
important to the proposals outlined in this article, reasonableness 
review on appeal incorporates procedural and substantive 
components.222 
 
 217. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“We infer appropriate review standards from 
related statutory language, the structure of the statute, and the ‘sound 
administration of justice’ . . . [a]nd in this instance those factors, in addition to the 
past two decades of appellate practice in cases involving departures, imply a 
practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts: review for 
‘unreasonable[ness].’”).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (2009); see also Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (“The federal courts of appeals review federal 
sentences and set aside those they find ‘unreasonable.’” (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 
261–63)); United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007); Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007); Berman, supra note 23, at 143; Jefferson Exum, 
supra note 23, at 118. 
 218. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61. 
 219. In Booker, the Court also struck down § 3742(e) because it cross-
referenced § 3553(b).  Section 3742(e) set forth the standard of review before 
“reasonableness.”  Section 3742(e) stated that appellate courts were to review 
sentences to determine whether they were (1) in violation of law; (2) resulting 
from an incorrect application of the Guidelines; (3) outside of the applicable 
Guidelines range; and (4) whether the district court failed to provide a written 
statement of reasons, or the sentence departed from the Guidelines range based 
on an improper factor or in contradiction to the facts.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp. 
2005). 
 220. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–49; Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 
91. 
 221. See Gall, 522 U.S. at 51. 
 222. See id.; United States v. Irizarry, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (refusing to require 
the district court to provide notice to the parties that it intends to vary its imposed 
sentence from the Guidelines).  For the procedural component, the appellate 
court must first ensure that the district court “committed no significant procedural 
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 
factors . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an 
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
For the substantive component, the reasonableness review is an abuse of discretion 
type standard, where the appellate court should afford “due deference to the 
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify [the 
sentence].”  Id. 
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Because of the constitutional holding and the procedural 
guidance in Booker, the confusion about proving sentencing 
enhancements and imposing a sentence came to rest.  By 
rendering the Guidelines advisory, the litigation process returned 
to the prosecution proving elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
and district court judges’ findings of sentencing factors by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  More important than procedural 
changes after Booker is the shift toward judicial discretion, lower 
sentences for defendants, and liberated prosecutors at federal 
sentencing.   
1. The Return of Judicial Discretion at Sentencing 
Following Booker, district courts again enjoy discretion at 
sentencing.223  Restoring discretion to district judges may be the 
best explanation of how the constitutional challenge to judicial fact 
finding resulted in the Court’s remedy in Booker and the “advisory” 
Guidelines.224  The district court, after navigating the procedural 
steps,225 now enjoys the freedom to impose a sentence between the 
statutory minimum (often no jail time) and the statutory 
maximum. 
 
 
 
 223. See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 750–52 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008). The district court reasoned, “[I]f not for the wisdom of the Supreme Court 
in recognizing the need to free district courts from the shackles of the mandatory 
guidelines regime, I would have been confronted with the prospect of having to 
impose what I believe any rational jurist would consider to be a draconian 
sentence.”  Id.  With an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life, the Parris 
court imposed 60 months imprisonment for a fraud resulting in more than $2.5 
million in loss and involving 500 victims.  Id. 
 224. See United State v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); see also Fisher, supra 
note 6, at 74–77 (2007), which discusses that, as written, the Guidelines violated 
the Sixth Amendment.  Fact findings increase the term to which a defendant may 
be sentenced.  This operation of the Guidelines violated Apprendi.  However, in the 
remedial part of the opinion, the Booker court rendered the Guidelines effectively 
advisory, thereby taking them outside of the scope of Apprendi.  Id. 
 225. Compare Gall, 522 U.S. at 51 (discussing the possible procedural error the 
district court must now navigate at sentencing post-Booker, such as “failing to 
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors . . . , or failing to 
adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any 
deviation from the Guidelines range”), with infra Part VI (proposing amendments 
to Rule 11 and the Guidelines that require the district court to conduct the same 
procedural reasonableness review of a binding plea agreement and “specific 
sentence” therein).   
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Increasingly since Booker, courts’ sentences fall below the 
applicable range of imprisonment226 called for when the Guidelines 
were mandatory.  The sentencing court can support almost any 
sentence post-Booker with the broad policy statements and statutory 
factors that judges must now consider.  District court judges very 
seldom have exercised their discretion to hand down harsher 
sentences post-Booker.227 
The judicial discretion of today promises not to present the 
same problems of pre-Guidelines discretion.  Almost twenty years 
with the Guidelines and the post-Booker process ensures that district 
courts will exercise their discretion more appropriately and 
consistently with the goals of uniformity and proportionality.228  
This article’s criticism of restored judicial discretion relates to its 
incompatibility with binding plea agreements and the 
counterbalance of the defendant’s interest in predictability.  
 
 
 
 
 226. In federal criminal law, organizations gather and practitioners discuss 
sentencing data in terms of months of imprisonment.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5A.  Other sentencing options and punishments are 
available by statute and under the Guidelines, including probation, community 
confinement, home confinement, supervised release, fines, restitution, and 
forfeiture, as well as certain collateral consequences of a federal conviction.  For 
purposes of this article, the net benefit to the criminal defendant since Booker is 
more easily presented in terms of lower terms of imprisonment.  
 227. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 2ND 
QUARTER RELEASE, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N tbl.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly
_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_2nd.pdf [hereinafter Q2 
2010 DATA] (finding that a little over 500 of the nearly 40,000 sentences, about 
one percent, were above-Guidelines sentences relying on Booker or § 3553(a), as 
opposed to the court’s grant of a government upward departure under the 
Guidelines); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,  FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING vii (2006), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and
_Reports/Submissions/200603_Booker/Booker_Report.pdf [hereinafter BOOKER 
REPORT] (“The rate of imposition of above-range sentences [was] . . . 1.6 percent 
after Booker.”). 
 228. Booker, 523 U.S. at 243–44 (setting out the procedural requirements for 
post-Booker and the “reasonableness” framework of appellate review).  The 
procedural requirement of the Guidelines, particularly after almost twenty years of 
mandatory application, promises to yield more uniform and reasoned sentences 
than from the judicial discretion before the mandatory Guidelines.  Id. 
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2. The Statistical Benefit to Defendants 
The statistics in the four years following Booker speak well for 
the individual defendant.229  While the Commission wishes to 
interpret the data as status quo,230 the sentences imposed since 
Booker reflect that judicial discretion and prosecutorial flexibility 
favor the defendant and should continue to do so.231  The judiciary 
has spoken more clearly about certain types of prosecutions and 
defendants.232  For example, district court judges, by their 
sentences, have commented on the federal system’s treatment of 
first-time offenders, as well as so-called “career offenders.”233  
The Commission, in its Booker Report released in 2006, stated 
that “[a] lack of uniformity that existed pre-Booker in the reporting 
of sentencing information to the Commission, especially the 
 
 229. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, preamble at vii (“The rate of government-
sponsored, below-range sentences has increased . . . after Booker to a rate of 23.7 
percent [in 2006.]  . . . The rate of imposition of [other] below-range sentences 
has increased after Booker to a rate of 12.5 percent[,] . . . [and i]n approximately 
two-thirds of cases involving [other] below-range sentences, the extent of the 
reductions granted are less than 40 percent below the minimum of the range.”); 
Q2 2010 DATA, supra note 227, at tbls.1 & 2 (demonstrating that, between October 
2009 and March 2010, less than fifty-seven percent of sentences were within or 
above the Guidelines range and, in almost thirteen percent of cases, district courts 
impose a lower sentence, citing Booker or § 3553(a), as opposed to a recognized 
departure in the Guidelines). 
 230. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at vi.  The Commission attempts to classify 
its post-Booker statistics as highly consistent with the mandatory Guidelines 
statistics.  For example: “National data show that when within-range sentences and 
government-sponsored, below-range sentences are combined, the rate of sentencing in 
conformance with the sentencing guidelines is 85.9 percent.  This conformance 
rate remained stable throughout the year that followed Booker.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).  The statistic is misleading because it fails to account for the additional 
government-sponsored, below-Guidelines sentences and the significant variances 
awarded in the majority of below-Guidelines sentences imposed post-Booker.  
 231. See supra note 229. 
 232. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at ix–xi. 
 233. Id.  “The rate of imposition of below-range sentences for first offenders 
increased after Booker. . . . [and t]he rate of imposition of below-range sentences 
for career offenders increased after Booker.”  Id. at x; see also Q2 2010 DATA, supra 
note 227, at tbl.3 (aggregating sentencing data by offense conduct category, for 
example, courts recently imposed below-Guidelines sentences without grounds for 
Guidelines departures often in white collar, pornography, and drug trafficking 
offenses); cf. Marcia Coyle, Justice Department Calls for Probe of Federal Sentencing 
Patterns, NAT’L L.J., July 19, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj
/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463650912&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (“Those widely 
disparate sentences don’t make sense, ignore federal sentencing guidelines and 
are a sign of a potentially very big problem, according to the U.S. Department of 
Justice.”). 
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reporting of reasons for the sentence imposed, was exacerbated 
post-Booker.”234  The Commission also reported that the results were 
too preliminary to understand the decision’s effects.  “The 
differences in practice and procedure that resulted from Booker are 
not entirely quantifiable, and this impacts the quality of the data 
collected.”235   
Statistics represent generalized trends.  Yet, has the federal 
system revived the pre-Guidelines problem of a defendant’s 
sentence depending more upon the judge imposing sentence than 
the process required at sentencing?  The generation of judges that 
has presided on the federal bench only during the mandatory 
Guidelines era may cling to the structure of the Guidelines and 
reserve variances only for an occasional outlier case.  Courts have 
identified a problem of “guidelineism,” or “guidelinitis”—the 
inability of some federal courts to break their habit of mechanically 
relying on the Guidelines alone.236  Most district judges since Booker 
may impose a lower sentence for a defendant in certain cases; the 
variable for some defendants is in appreciating where their case fits 
in. 
3. Liberated Federal Prosecutors 
The return of judicial discretion to the courts was not only 
significant for defendants, but also for the government.237  
Government attorneys, too, were liberated from the mandatory 
federal sentencing scheme post-Booker.  After Booker, the judiciary 
has imposed sentences based more upon government-sponsored 
motions rather than those based upon substantial assistance.238  
 
 234. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at v. 
 235. Id. at vi. 
 236. See United States v. Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 828–29 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, 
J., dissenting). 
 237. Q2 2010 DATA, supra note 227, at tbl.1; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 3RD QUARTER RELEASE, U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N tbls.1 & 2 (2010),  available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics
/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2010_Qua
rter_Report_3rd.pdf [hereinafter Q3 2010 DATA] (demonstrating the increase in 
the categories of “government sponsored” motions and the increase in judicial 
variances that the government may not be opposing as vehemently post-Booker); cf. 
supra notes 88–92, 134–137 (discussing the DOJ protocol during the mandatory 
Guidelines to argue for Guidelines sentences and oppose all motions for 
downward departure or otherwise lower sentences).  
 238. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at vii; see also Q3 2010 DATA, supra note 
237, at tbls.1 & 2 (providing statistics for sentences relative to the Guidelines range 
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Further, the government cannot reasonably, and does not after 
Booker, oppose all motions for a below-Guidelines sentence, argue 
for Guidelines sentences, or blindly defend the Guidelines range in 
all cases.  Prosecutorial discretion has also returned to federal 
sentencing, and a renewed role for binding plea agreements is 
consistent with the trend.239 
V. RENEWED ROLE FOR BINDING PLEA AGREEMENTS 
A sentencing scheme, particularly one reliant on judicial 
discretion, must allow a defendant to pursue, negotiate, and 
contract for what he believes is a consistent and predictable sentence 
in his or her case.240  This article argues that, in addition to restored 
judicial discretion and lower sentences, the pendulum also must 
swing toward predictability and informed decision making for 
defendants.  Following Booker, the government and the defendant 
must be permitted to negotiate binding plea agreements in some 
circumstances. 
District court judges should be more open to binding plea 
agreements.  Although it is too early to tell, the opposite result is 
more likely.  This generation of district court judges, after almost 
twenty years of the mandatory Guidelines, may disfavor anything 
that minimizes their role at sentencing.241  Prosecutors, too, will 
 
by circuit and district and by each primary offense).  These reports indicate a 
trend toward more government-sponsored motions for lower sentences other than 
its predominant substantial assistance motion. 
 239. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227; see also Q3 2010 DATA, supra note 237, 
at tbls.1 & 2 (providing statistics for sentences relative to the Guidelines range by 
circuit and district, and by each primary offense).  Defense attorneys and district 
courts today argue both for traditional grounds of departure under the Guidelines 
and for lower sentences based upon downward variances from the Guidelines 
range.  Although difficult to glean from Commission reports, the government 
does not, and cannot, oppose all motions, arguments, and judicial findings for 
below-Guidelines sentences. 
 240. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C); see also supra Part V (discussing a renewed 
role for binding plea agreements post-Booker).  
 241. See supra note 143 (discussing how district court judges may continue to 
disfavor binding plea agreements after the Supreme Court restored their 
discretion in Booker); supra Part IV.C (discussing the limited judicial role in a “plea 
and sentence” federal system).  After almost twenty years of having the 
Commission severely limit its discretion at sentencing, district courts will likely not 
embrace a mechanism that similarly impacts the court’s discretion to impose its 
sentence.  Other courts did not favor binding plea agreements during the 
mandatory Guidelines, and will be less inclined to accept a “specific sentence” 
today.  See, e.g., United States v Seidman, 483 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Wis. 1980) (“At 
the outset, the Court would note that it never will accept a . . . [binding] plea 
  
516 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:2 
likely not embrace binding plea agreements without significant 
changes to the rules, perceptions, and stigma today associated with 
them.  Even if inclined, the Commission has not amended the 
Guidelines’ treatment of binding plea agreements following Booker. 
A. The Guise of Continued Uniformity Post-Booker 
The Commission’s post-Booker data collection analysis purports 
that its two central policy considerations of uniformity and 
proportionality continue to be served.242  There are several reasons 
that uniformity and proportionality will not endure.243 
First, the judges imposing sentences in the four years following 
Booker were primarily the same judges appointed and presiding 
during the mandatory Guidelines era.  Whether mandatory or 
advisory, some of these judges will default to what they know best: 
exercising their discretion within a relatively narrow window.  
Second, some judges earnestly continue to sentence according to 
the Guidelines to promote uniformity between similarly situated 
defendants sentenced today and before 2005.  As new judges are 
appointed and memories of mandatory Guidelines fade, there is 
likely to be less uniformity and proportionality. 
Restoring the trial courts’ discretion to determine appropriate 
sentences based upon individuals, as opposed to calculations, and 
to lower sentences were progressive developments.244  The 
individual defendant’s perception of sentencing, however, has not 
 
agreement.  It is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of sentence that 
should be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or she has been 
adjudged guilty.”).    
 242.  See supra note 230 (discussing the Commission’s attempt to convey 
consistent post-Booker results); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 
17 FED. SENT’G REP. 249, 249–50 (2005). 
 243.  See supra note 229 (demonstrating that the statistics show courts have 
strayed further away from the Guidelines in the five years following Booker); see also 
Jefferson Exum, supra note 23, at 117 (“[T]he tension between procedural 
reasonableness based on consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines and 
substantive reasonableness that allows district judges to disregard the Guidelines 
for policy errors suggests that the best path toward achieving the balance between 
sentencing uniformity and sentencing discretion endorsed in Booker is to rethink 
the role of the Sentencing Guidelines.”). 
 244.  See supra Part IV.C (discussing the “post-Booker effect” in terms of 
returned judicial discretion, lower and more individualized sentences for 
defendants, and liberated prosecutors).  The court’s restored discretion, relative 
to pre-Guidelines judicial discretion, is more uniform, proportional, and reasoned 
due to the procedural and substantive requirements imposed by the Court in 
Booker.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223 (2005). 
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gone unaffected.  When the mandatory Guidelines were applied, 
the defendant and his counsel could reasonably predict the post-
plea outcome and make informed decisions.245  Post-Booker, the 
structured process again depends as much upon the judge as it 
does upon sentencing considerations.246 
B. The Potential Impact of Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker 
Now that the Guidelines are rendered “advisory,” the parties 
must be encouraged and empowered to negotiate and contract for 
a “specific sentence or sentencing ranges” in appropriate cases.247  
There are reasons that a prosecutor may want to enter into a 
binding plea agreement in some cases.  This article focuses on the 
defendant’s motivation post-Booker.  With a less predictable result, 
some defendants under the advisory Guidelines may be motivated 
by a negotiated result that they were involved in reaching.248 
Putting motivation aside, the government and the defendant 
must be permitted to negotiate the plea agreement’s most 
important term without significant limitation.249  The government and 
the defendant, like a sentencing court, can consider federal 
sentencing policy, the Guidelines, and other factors.  As proposed 
in Part VI, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the 
Guidelines should permit (and encourage) the parties to undergo 
the same process in reaching an agreed-upon sentence in a binding 
plea agreement, as the court does in imposing a sentence.  The 
parties’ consideration of the same factors may yield more 
consistent, predictable, and personally satisfying results. 
 
 245.  See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 2 (outlining 
Guidelines provisions relative to hundreds of different offenses and offense 
conduct characteristics). 
 246.  See supra Part I (comparing the predictability and information available 
in a Guidelines conversation and post-Booker conversation). 
 247.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 248.  The defendant’s motivation during the mandatory Guidelines would 
have been exclusively to negotiate a lower sentence than called for under the 
mandatory Guidelines.  Post-Booker, the defendant’s motivations have become 
more complex.  For example, in modern federal sentencing, the defendant’s 
desire to negotiate for a “specific sentence” in a binding plea agreement may be 
hedging against an unpredictable judge or a desire for an early resolution of the 
sentence, as well as the guilt phase. 
 249.  Compare supra Part V (discussing a renewed role for binding plea 
agreements), with supra Part III.B (discussing how the Guidelines, Section 6B1.2, 
and its commentary, rendered binding plea agreements meaningless, and 
marginalized their use for more than twenty years). 
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The court’s standard for acceptance of the binding plea 
agreement could reflect the appellate court’s review of judicially 
imposed sentences.250  The district court’s acceptance of a binding 
plea agreement could have both the procedural and substantive 
component of the review.251  First, the district court could review 
whether the parties in the plea agreement navigated through the 
same procedural hoops required of it.252  Second, the district court 
could evaluate the “specific sentence or sentencing range” in the 
plea agreement for “reasonableness.”253  Because a binding plea 
agreement accepted by the court typically involves no appeal, this 
new standard for acceptance would reinforce sentencing 
uniformity and sentences reviewed for reasonableness. 
C. Binding Plea Agreements in Enron Prosecution of the NatWest 3 
In 2006, one of the first-filed Enron cases, involving three 
British bankers who worked for NatWest and were accused of fraud, 
was approaching its trial date.254  The “NatWest 3,” as the media 
dubbed them, proceeded to trial late due to a hotly contested and 
high-level extradition battle to bring the bankers to the United 
States to face the charges related to their dealings with Enron 
executives.255  In England, the media and other outlets vilified the 
United States for its pursuit of the NatWest 3, who maintained both 
their innocence and their belief that the crimes alleged were not 
indictable offenses in their home country.256  For these reasons, and 
due to the growing attention to Enron in general, the prosecution 
and a successful result were of great importance to the DOJ. 
 
 250. See supra note 222 (discussing the Supreme Court’s formulation of 
“reasonableness” review and its procedural and substantive components 
established in Gall, Rita, and Kimbrough). 
 251. See id. 
 252. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (establishing the 
procedural framework of consideration framing the trial court’s post-Booker 
discretion). 
 253. Id. at 262–68 (implementing “reasonableness” as the appellate standard 
of review). 
 254. Simon Freeman, Enron Three Lose Test Case Against Extradition to U.S., TIMES 
(London), Feb. 21, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk
/article733156.ece (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); NatWest Three: The U.S. Indictment, 
BBC NEWS, July 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5174358.stm (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
 255. See Freeman, supra note 254. 
 256. Steve Boggan, We Want British Justice, Not a US Witchhunt, TIMES (London), 
Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article509608.ece
?token=null&offset=0&page=1.  
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As to the three defendants, the matter was resolved by binding 
plea agreements.257  From the defendants’ perspective, they ran a 
litigation risk of conviction at trial and the prospect of a higher 
sentence.  They also negotiated a specific sentence when the 
judge’s sentence following guilty pleas was more unpredictable.  Of 
Judge Gleeson’s prosecutorial motivations for entering into a 
binding plea agreement, many were present in the NatWest 3 
prosecution.258  If the case had proceeded to trial and the 
defendants were convicted, many in Great Britain and in the 
international media would have considered the prosecution unfair, 
politically motivated, and potentially motivating for other countries 
to use as fodder for retribution in dealing with U.S. citizens 
accused of crimes abroad. 
  The admissions at their respective guilty pleas, taken as part 
of a binding plea agreement, quieted the impending storm.  The 
term of imprisonment imposed may have represented “justifiable 
reasons” under the Guidelines Section 6B1.2, or an unjustified, 
discounted plea.  In the end, the specific sentence proved far less 
important than reaching an agreement.259  The case should 
exemplify the importance and potential impact of binding plea 
agreements post-Booker. 
D. The Downside to Binding Plea Agreements  
 It is important to note that binding plea agreements are not 
appropriate in all, or even most, federal cases.  While this article 
generally proposes an increased use of binding plea agreements, in 
the majority of federal criminal cases the government will not want 
to explore a negotiated sentence.  In many serious federal cases, 
 
 257. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Bermingham, No. 02CR00597, 2007 
WL 4983408 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2007); cf. Moohr, supra note 104, at 941–42 
(praising the Guidelines’ uniform and unbiased treatment of white collar crime 
cases). 
 258. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 640.  Specifically, there were definite trial risks 
that the jury would not understand the evidence or the legal theory of the case 
and, more generally, of an acquittal.  Also present were considerations that the 
result was “fair in the circumstances,” which included a lengthy pretrial stay in the 
United States and a significant post-indictment delay due to the extradition issues.  
Maybe even, as Judge Gleeson describes, “the milk of human kindness” factored 
into the agreement.  Id. 
 259. Pursuant to the plea agreements in United States v. Bermingham, each 
containing substantially the same terms, the defendant and the government 
agreed to a “specific sentence” of thirty-seven months imprisonment.  Plea 
Agreement, Bermingham, 2007 WL 498430, at *38.   
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the government still will argue for a significant sentence to be 
imposed by the court.  Negotiating an appropriate resolution has 
not been part of the federal prosecutor’s duties in more than 
twenty years.  Like the judiciary, adapting to a renewed role for 
binding plea agreements after the Guidelines’ era will not come 
easily.    
The binding plea agreement must be beneficial to the 
government, as well as the defendant.  There are still some cases 
where a federal felony conviction and a sentence are more 
important than a sentence of a specific duration or a Guidelines 
sentence.  So long as the defendant appreciates the potential risk 
in the post-Booker binding plea agreement, the tool could prove 
worthwhile in some cases.   
 The binding plea agreement, even in the appropriate case, has 
potential downsides for the defendant.  First, binding plea 
agreements come with the inherent contractual risks of bargaining 
for a specific sentence.260  The defendant may have sought a 
“specific sentence or sentencing range” in a binding plea 
agreement in an effort to avoid the sentence to be imposed by the 
court or for his own piece of mind in having negotiated a known 
result.261  But the risk is the bargained-for result could be greater 
than the sentence that the court now would have imposed post-
Booker.  
 Second, the binding agreement, once accepted by the court, 
is final and will not be subject to typical challenges on appeal.262  
 
 260. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the word “binding” in the plea agreement context keeps its ordinary 
meaning under contract principles); see also Cicchini, supra note 18, at 173. (“Every 
plea bargain contains one or more promises and contemplates exchange between 
the government and the defendant either immediately, in the future, or both.”). 
 261. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).  A negotiated sentence under Rule 
11(c)(1)(C) in the post-Booker era will likely call for a “specific sentence or 
sentencing range” below the Guidelines.   
 262. Since binding plea agreements were introduced into federal criminal 
practice in the 1970s, courts have held that a defendant who explicitly and 
voluntarily exposes himself to a specific sentence may not challenge that 
punishment on appeal.  United States v. Green, 595 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the defendant was bound by his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, 
despite the subsequent change to the Guidelines related to crack cocaine and § 
3782’s function to lower sentences based upon subsequent changes to the 
Guidelines); see United States v. Pratt, 657 F.2d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1981); see also 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B), (e) (stating that a defendant must demonstrate a 
reason for requesting withdrawal of plea); United States v. Pagan-Ortega, 372 F.3d 
22, 28 (1st Cir. 2004) (regret is not an acceptable grounds to withdraw a plea; 
defendant must prove an unfair and unjust result to withdraw binding 
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Thus, the positives of owning contractual responsibilities can also 
be the negatives.263  Contract principles dictate that either party 
may rescind the plea agreement before the court’s acceptance of 
the agreement,264 yet, once accepted, the contact is formed and 
mutually enforceable.265  Further, parties will likely memorialize 
agreed-upon sentences pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in a plea 
agreement accompanied by an appellate waiver266 or, at the very 
least, the determinative sentence will be presumptively 
reasonable.267  In addition, the specific sentence in a binding plea 
agreement will not qualify for a sentence modification under § 
3582(c), which allows for a sentence to be adjusted if the 
Sentencing Commission lowers relevant Guidelines.268  Nor will it 
be adjusted for other post-sentencing “corrections” under Rule 
35(b).269  Once agreed to and accepted with the sentence imposed, 
 
11(c)(1)(C) agreement).  See generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, § 611.02 n.11. 
 263. Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 282 (holding that a binding plea agreement could 
not be undone by the discretionary possibility of a different sentence under the 
Guidelines). 
 264. The general rule, however, is subject to a detrimental reliance exception.  
Even if the agreement has not been finalized by the court, “[a] defendant’s 
detrimental reliance on a prosecutorial promise in plea bargaining could make a 
plea agreement binding.”  McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1986), 
vacated in part on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 265. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that when determining whether disputed plea agreements have been 
formed or conditions performed, courts have drawn the formation and 
interpretation of commercial contracts); see generally Peter Westen & David Westin, 
A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978) 
(analyzing criminal plea agreements in terms of contractual scenarios). 
 266. Every circuit has held that some forms of appeal waivers are permissible 
in a plea agreement.  See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir. 
2003); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Jemison, 237 
F.3d 911, 916–18 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 559–63 
(3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21–27 (1st Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402–06 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nguyen, 
235 F.3d 1179, 1182–84 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rubio, 231 F.3d 709, 711-
13 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 267. United States v. Welker, No. 09-3409, 2010 WL 2542966, at *1 (8th Cir. 
June 25, 2010) (opining that “Welker received the very sentence he agreed to in 
his plea agreement”). 
 268. See Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 280–81 (citing United States v. Cieslowski, 410 
F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
 269. United States v. Semler, 883 F.2d 832, 833–34 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that Rule 11(e)(3) forbids a lenient departure, even based on Rule 35(b), which 
permits courts to correct illegal sentences, when the sentence was agreed to under 
an 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement). 
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the agreement will be enforced.270 
 Third, a binding plea agreement is subject to some of the 
same limitations as any other plea agreement in federal court.  For 
instance, the agreement will not bind separate sovereigns, such as 
state prosecution offices, that may prosecute a defendant for the 
similar conduct.271  Whether binding or not, a plea agreement is a 
contract between a defendant and the specific prosecutor’s office 
signing the agreement, and the agreement must be supported in 
the facts.272  Further, the court must determine that there is a 
factual basis for the plea, as there are no “legal fictions” in federal 
plea bargaining.273 
 
 
 270. See United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 
United States v. Fritsch, 891 F.2d 667, 668 (8th Cir. 1989) (“This court has held 
that a defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to a specific 
sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal.” (citing United States v. 
Pratt, 657 F.2d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1981))). 
 271. See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a 
United States Attorney negotiates and contracts on behalf of ‘the United States’ or 
‘the Government’ in a plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney speaks for 
and binds all of his or her fellow United States Attorneys with respect to those 
same crimes and those same defendants.”); United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d 
1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that while ambiguities in plea agreement must 
be construed against the government, where language is clear in binding only a 
particular district, another district is not bound by the agreement); United States 
v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that “[a] plea agreement 
binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the 
plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a 
broader restriction”).  But see United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 
1986) (construing ambiguity in plea agreement against the Government and thus 
holding the agreement was binding on another federal district); Elaine K. Zipp, 
Annotation, When is Federal Prosecutor Bound by Promises of Immunity or Plea Bargains 
Made by Another Federal Agent, 55 A.L.R. FED. 402 (1981). 
 272. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 2–3 (admonishing federal 
prosecutors from “fact bargaining” or otherwise keeping information from 
probation and the court); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) 
(a plea agreement negotiated by one prosecutor is binding upon all other 
prosecutors on the same staff); see also DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, C. PETER ERLINDER & 
DAVID C. THOMAS, Pleas and Plea Bargaining, in CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 
12.06(11)(e) (2009) (explaining the court’s reasoning and holding in Santobello). 
 273. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1966 
amendments) (“The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the 
attorney for the government, or by examining the presentence report, or 
otherwise, that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense 
charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which 
the defendant has pleaded guilty.”).  Some district courts read the judicial duty—
to ensure there is a “factual basis for the plea”—to mean factual support for a term 
of the plea agreement, such as the “specific sentence” in a binding plea 
agreement.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
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These risks and requirements of binding plea agreements must 
be considered.  And a binding plea agreement will not be 
appropriate in most federal prosecutions.  This article’s proposed 
renewed role for binding plea agreements, and the substantive 
proposals that follow, advocate for the opportunity for the 
government and the individual defendant to negotiate and 
contract for appropriate sentences in some cases. 
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES TO EMBRACE BINDING PLEA 
AGREEMENTS 
This article proposes that Congress should enact a new 
standard for judicial acceptance of binding plea agreements post-
Booker.  Congress should empower criminal defendants and federal 
prosecutors in some cases to negotiate and contract for a sentence 
they perceive is uniform, proportional, and just.  Binding plea 
agreements are not appropriate in most cases, yet the parties must 
be permitted to enter into agreements for a specific sentence that 
is “reasonable” and consistent with Congress’s original intent 
underlying Rule 11(c)(1)(C).274  Instead, the Guidelines’ outdated 
standard continues to marginalize this potentially valuable tool.   
The Guidelines’ policy statement and commentary related to 
accepting binding plea agreements is inapplicable after Booker.275  
Trial courts are imposing below-Guideline sentences in more than 
forty percent of cases.276  No criminal defendant today would 
negotiate for a Guidelines sentence when statistics show it to be the 
worst-case scenario.277  The current standard demands that the 
court reject a binding plea agreement in some circumstances when 
the court would have imposed a similar sentence without the 
binding agreement.  This must change.   
 
 
 274. United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that 
Rule 11 “specifically provide[d] for possible concessions that the government may 
make in a plea agreement . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 275. See Q2 2010 DATA, supra note 227 (discussing that district courts 
increasingly are imposing sentences below the Guidelines, almost forty percent, 
according to the Commission’s last quarterly report, and the amount of the 
variance from the Guidelines is similarly increasing).  
 276. Q3 2010 DATA, supra note 237, at tbls.1 & 2 (showing that between 
October 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010, 43.4% of sentences were below the Guidelines 
range). 
 277. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the statistical benefit to the defendant 
post-Booker). 
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Further, it has been almost twenty years since binding plea 
agreements served an important role in federal criminal practice.  
As a result, most district judges and prosecutors are likely not 
familiar with binding plea agreements.278  District courts still 
evaluate the merits of the specific sentence called for in a binding 
plea agreement.279  The standard must shift from a less qualitative 
evaluation of the sentence to a standard similar to the appellate 
review of imposed sentences, the deferential standard of 
reasonableness. 
Lastly, the prosecutorial stigma and mystery of binding plea 
agreements also lessen the likelihood of its renewed role.  The 
stigma associated with binding plea agreements derives from the 
sub rosa and underground deals struck during the mandatory 
Guidelines era.  The mystery involves seeking judicial acceptance of 
a deal with a judge who is prohibited by statute from having a role 
in plea negotiations.  This article proposes changes to Rule 11, the 
Guidelines’ policy statements, new DOJ protocol, a proposed local 
rule, and more palpable plea agreement language.   
A. Proposed Revisions to Rule 11 
The standard for judicial acceptance of a binding plea 
agreement must change.  Congress should enact an amendment to 
Rule 11 that introduces a new standard.  The new standard, like the 
appellate court’s reasonableness review of judicially imposed 
sentences, should have a procedural and substantive component.280  
 
 278. The Guidelines were implemented in 1987 and marginalized the role of 
binding plea agreements through a policy statement and commentary.  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3,  §§ 6B1.2(c), 6B1.2 cmt. (defining the standard 
for judicial acceptance of a binding plea agreement). 
 279. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (describing the court’s discretion to 
accept or reject a binding plea agreement). 
 280. See supra note 222 (discussing the Supreme Court’s test of 
“reasonableness” as having a procedural and substantive component); Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining court’s review of judicially 
imposed sentences must include procedural and substantive considerations); see 
also United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Reasonableness 
review involves both procedural and substantive components.”); United States v. 
Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[R]easonableness depends not only 
on the length of the sentence but on the process by which it is imposed.”). 
  It is important to note that a district court’s imposed sentence may be 
challenged as unreasonable by the defendant for being too high or by the 
government for being too low.  See United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 906–07 
(10th Cir. 2006) (in which the defendant challenged his sentence as unreasonable 
because it was higher than the recommended sentencing range).  In this article’s 
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Procedurally, the district court should review the binding plea 
agreement to ensure that the parties engaged in the same process, 
ran the same calculations, and considered the same factors that the 
district court would consider at sentencing.281  Substantively, the 
district court should review the specific sentence or sentencing 
range in the agreement with an abuse of discretion type of 
standard.282 
The Court has noted in cases since Booker that the reviewing 
court should defer to the district court as the entity with the 
greatest familiarity with the case; applying that same analysis, the 
parties to a binding plea agreement have an even greater familiarity 
with the facts than the district court.283   If the government and the 
defendant navigate the same process and agree upon a reasonable 
sentence, then the new standard should require the court to accept 
the agreement.  The district judge that disagrees with, values 
differently, or otherwise dislikes the sentence imposed must defer 
to the contracting parties.  The amendment to Rule 11 could read 
 
proposal to have district court judges review the sentence in a binding plea 
agreement for reasonableness, the court need only access the inevitable downward 
variance of a binding plea agreement.  See id. at 907 (“[T]he extremity of the 
variance between the actual sentence imposed and the applicable Guidelines 
range should determine the amount of scrutiny we give to the district court’s 
substantive sentence.”). 
 281. For example, under the New Jersey state sentencing scheme, a state judge 
must accept a plea agreement unless the specific sentence in the agreement 
“contravenes the sentencing criteria of the code” or the record demonstrates 
prosecutorial abuse of discretion.  See State v. Bilse, 581 A.2d 518, 523 (N.J. 1990). 
 282. Parties should reflect their considerations of the proper sentencing 
factors in the plea agreement, whereas the court must place the same 
considerations on the record.  See United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 170 
n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[C]laims of noncompliance with rule 11 must be resolved 
solely on the basis of the rule 11 transcript. That transcript provides all that is 
needed and all that is allowed for the resolution of such claims.”).  
  A counterargument against allowing the government and a defendant to 
contract for a specific sentence so long as they consider the same factors is abuse 
and disparate treatment.  The enhanced prosecutorial discretion, the discretion to 
grant binding agreements, and the extent of the benefit, may be ripe for abuse 
and unbalanced application.  Yet, many federal prosecution offices have an 
approved hierarchy and internal policies reflecting their declination/prosecution 
standards.  Similarly, these prosecution shops have committees and standards for 
granting downward departures and approving the amount of the departure 
recommended to the court.  Binding plea agreements could be handled in the 
same way.  Prosecution offices could establish internal standards, committees, and 
hierarchical approval for granting and valuing binding plea agreements.   
 283. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (holding that the trial judge 
has “greater familiarity with . . . the individual case and the individual defendant 
before him . . .” (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007))). 
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as follows (new language in bold): 
 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, IV. 
ARRAIGNMENT AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL , Rule 
11. Pleas * * * (c) Plea Agreement Procedure. * * *  (3) 
Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.   
(A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type 
specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may 
accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until 
the court has reviewed the presentence report.  
* * * 
(C) The court shall review any written plea agreement 
entered into pursuant to subsection Rule 11(c)(1)(C).  
The agreement must demonstrate that the parties in 
reaching the specific sentence or sentencing range in the 
agreement considered the same factors and policy 
statements that the court would consider at sentencing.284  
If the parties did so and the specific sentence or 
sentencing range is reasonable, then the court shall accept 
the agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and impose 
sentence accordingly.   
 
Such a standard encourages the parties to negotiate binding 
plea agreements in some cases and removes the stigma associated 
with binding plea agreements.  Finally, this new standard takes the 
mystery out of bringing a binding plea agreement before a judge 
who may reject the agreement based upon reasons not known to 
the parties.  An act of Congress in amending Rule 11 is not the only 
way to enact a new standard for judicial acceptance of plea 
agreements; the Commission could also change the Guideline 
policy statements after Booker.  
 
 284. Today, the agreement must reflect that the parties (i) calculated the 
applicable sentencing range under the applicable edition of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines; (ii) considered the applicable range; and (iii) considered 
the factors set forth in § 3553(a).  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M) (The defendant 
must understand the process “in determining a sentence, the court’s obligation to 
calculate the applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range, 
possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing 
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . .”). 
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B. Proposed Amendment to the Applicable Guidelines’ Policy 
Statements 
Alternatively, but less likely, the Commission could introduce 
the new standard for judicial acceptance of binding plea 
agreements.  It was, after all, the Guidelines that ushered binding 
plea agreements out of federal criminal practice more than twenty 
years ago.285  The policy statement, however, could be redrafted to 
reflect the district court’s procedural and substantive review of a 
binding plea agreement as set out above.286  The inapplicable 
standard reflected in Guidelines policy carries no practical effect 
following Booker.287  The Guidelines should restore the parties’ 
“power to enter into sentence bargains pursuant to Rule 
11(c)(1)(C)” as Congress intended.288  
C. DOJ Protocol and Attorney General Memoranda  
Changing Rule 11 and the Guidelines would provide the 
government and defendant with the opportunity to enter into the 
type of binding plea agreements that Congress intended when it 
authorized their use under Rule 11.289  There must also be a 
perception change related to binding plea agreements post-Booker.  
 
 285. See supra Parts III.A and B (arguing that the mandatory Guidelines 
effectively replaced binding agreements and, through Guidelines’ policy 
statements, rendered these agreements meaningless for more than twenty years). 
 286. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that the 
court’s review of judicially imposed sentences must include procedural and 
substantive considerations); see also United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 
(4th Cir. 2006) (“Reasonableness review involves both procedural and substantive 
components.”); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(“[R]easonableness depends not only on the length of the sentence but on the 
process by which it is imposed.”); supra note 222 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
test of “reasonableness” as having a procedural and substantive component). 
  Practically, the district court has the benefit of a U.S. Probation’s pre-
sentence report (PSR), which includes the Guidelines calculation and the post-
Booker starting point for sentencing.  The parties to a binding plea agreement do 
not yet have the PSR or a fully developed calculation and applicable guideline 
range.  With the rule change and process proposed in this article, mirroring the 
sentencing court’s process is essential.  Perhaps parties considering a binding plea 
agreement could request a draft PSR from U.S. Probation that reflects the 
calculation portions of the PSR only.      
 287. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 660. 
 288. Id. at 639, 660–61. 
 289. As previously discussed in Part III.A, Congress encouraged parties in 
criminal cases to negotiate and agree, subject to court approval, “that a specific 
sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case.”  FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
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Binding plea agreements in federal court went from an essential 
part of federal criminal practice to prosecutorial taboo during the 
mandatory Guidelines era.290  This perception change would best 
come from a change to DOJ protocol and a more definitive 
statement about binding plea agreements from the Attorney 
General.   
The memoranda from the DOJ during the mandatory 
Guidelines era limited prosecutorial discretion and discouraged 
binding plea agreements.  The Justice Department under President 
Barack Obama could reinvigorate the binding plea agreement, 
encourage its use in federal criminal practice, and remove the 
prosecutorial stigma associated with the practice.  First, the DOJ 
could release a new policy statement in Section 9-16.000 of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Manual, entitled “Pleas—Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11.”291  Second, DOJ could incorporate by reference and 
release guidance in a section, or expansion of an existing section, 
its corresponding Criminal Resource Manual.292  Third, and most 
important, the Attorney General should author a memorandum 
designed to encourage binding plea agreements in appropriate 
cases.293  
On May 10, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder released a 
memorandum entitled “Department Policy on Charging and 
Sentencing” that addressed prosecutorial discretion and DOJ 
protocol for, among other things, entering into plea agreements 
and sentencing.294  This Attorney General memorandum states:  
 
In the typical case, the appropriate balance among these 
purposes will continue to be reflected by the applicable 
guidelines range, and prosecutors should generally 
 
 290. See id.  (discussing the negative effect of the mandatory Guidelines era 
and emphasizing the value of sentence bargaining). 
 291. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 623 (1997), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9
/crm00000.htm. 
 292. See id. (reciting the federal criminal rules governing pleas, including 
binding plea agreements in a section called “Pleas—Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11,” but remaining silent to the practice of entering into such 
agreements). 
 293. The Attorney General memorandum could empower local prosecution 
offices to establish supervisory and committee review of such decisions in the same 
fashion these offices have long valued sentencing recommendations in motions 
for downward departure based upon substantial assistance. 
 294. Holder 2010 Memo, supra note 90. 
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continue to advocate for a sentence within that range.  
The advisory guidelines remain important in furthering 
the goal of national uniformity throughout the federal 
system.  But consistent with the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution and given the advisory nature of the 
guidelines, advocacy at sentencing—like charging 
decisions and plea agreements—must also follow from an 
individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances 
of each particular case.  All prosecutorial requests for 
departures or variances . . . must be based upon specific 
and articulable factors, and require supervisory 
approval.295   
 
An amendment to Rule 11, as proposed above, could 
complement this recent expression of a federal prosecutor’s 
obligations during plea negotiations and at sentencing.  A new 
Attorney General memo could establish, or encourage components 
of the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to establish, the following 
policies and practices:  
 
(1) explore binding plea agreements in appropriate 
criminal cases that may reasonably be resolved by guilty 
plea; 
(2) educate the local federal judiciary about the merits of 
binding plea agreements in some cases in terms of contract 
rights, efficiency, and the interests of justice; 
(3) establish internal guidance about approval 
procedures, binding plea agreement committees, typical 
cases appropriate for negotiated resolution and valuation 
of sentencing considerations, specific sentences, and plea 
agreement provisions; and  
(4) promote sound contractual principles in plea 
bargaining and the notions of predictability and informed 
decision making for the defendant at sentencing.            
D. Proposed Local Rule 
The proposals outlined above should also be accompanied by 
a local rule.  Local rules are typically drafted by the judiciary and 
reviewed by the relevant offices.296  Assuming these groups also 
 
 295. Id. at 2–3. 
 296. For a local rule of criminal practice, as proposed here, the U.S. Attorney’s 
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favor increased predictability and informed decision making for 
the defendant, as well as enhanced prosecutorial ability to enter 
into binding plea agreements, the proposed rule may read as 
follows:  
 
Proposed Local Rule [#] 
(A) In a criminal case involving the adjudication of a 
felony offense, the district court shall follow a three-step 
process before imposing sentence and on the record.  
First, it must make findings as to the applicable U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions and applicable 
Guidelines’ range.  Second, the court must decide any 
motions departure or variance filed by either party.  
Third, the court must consider and weigh the factors to be 
considered in § 3553(a) of Title 18, United States Code.  
The court shall then impose a reasonable sentence 
supported by the process and considerations above and in 
the interests of justice. 
 
(B) Parties to a criminal case in this district are 
encouraged to explore, negotiate and contract for a 
“specific sentence or sentencing range” in a binding plea 
agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11(c)(1)(C).  
Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the government and a defendant  
may contract for a “specific sentence or sentencing range” 
that is binding on the court, so long as it is in writing, 
reflects the process that the court would follow and the 
factors the court would consider at sentencing, as set 
forth in subsection (A). 
 
(C) The district court shall accept a binding plea 
agreement if the agreement complies with subsection (B), 
reflects the process described in subsection (A), and the 
imposed sentence is reasonable. 
 
 
 
Office, Office of the Federal Defender, Chief Judge of the district or other 
delegates, local chapter of the Federal Bar Association, and any other local 
criminal defense organization or informal leaders in the federal criminal bar for 
the district should review any proposed local rule. 
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E. Proposed Plea Agreement Language 
Assuming a new standard for accepting binding plea 
agreements is established and a necessary perception change 
occurs, the parties to a binding plea agreement must do their part.  
The prosecution and the defense must demonstrate that the 
binding plea reflects the same process that the court would 
undergo at sentencing.  The parties must memorialize the post-
Booker considerations and discuss the factors that support the 
specific sentence or sentencing range featured in the binding plea 
agreement.   
Like the transcript of the district court’s sentencing 
proceeding for appellate review, the binding plea agreement must 
satisfy the reviewer that the proper process was followed.  
Specifically, the parties must actually calculate and consider the 
applicable Guidelines range, viable grounds for departure, § 
3553(a) factors, and memorialize these considerations in the plea 
agreement.297  The agreement must reflect a logical pathway from 
the considerations to the specific sentence. 
The parties should consider selecting a sentencing range 
under Rule 11(c)(1)(C).298  The majority of district court judges, as 
well as federal prosecutors, have only known the mandatory 
Guidelines and its ranges.  A binding plea agreement to a 
“sentencing range” has several advantages: the district court 
maintains its most familiar sentencing function, the range can span 
a gap in plea negotiations, and the district court, after imposing a 
sentence within a prescribed range, is more likely to find the 
sentence reasonable on review. 
 
 
 
 297. The location of the above recitation of considerations is not important.  It 
could be in a plea agreement, a statement of reasons incorporated by reference, 
or, if the reasoning need not be in the record, then in a joint letter to the court.    
 298. See United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d 1283, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(defendant stipulated in 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to a particular sentencing 
range, rather than a specific sentence); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 
1386-87 (9th Cir. 1986) (pre-Guidelines case where the parties agreed to a 
sentencing range of no more than three years and the court imposed eighteen 
months); United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1983) (pre-
Guidelines case setting forth the agreement that “any prison sentences imposed 
on [the] pleas of guilty shall not exceed ten years”); United States v. Howard, No. 
H-03-93, 2009 WL 1683798, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2009) (another Enron 
prosecution resolved by binding plea agreement, but to a “sentencing range” of 
four to twelve months of home confinement and/or probation). 
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Lastly, the parties should place information on the record not 
typically before the court in a pre-sentence report.  For instance, 
the government could articulate generally in a binding plea 
agreement that the specific sentence is partly based on a risk at 
trial, victim considerations, or due to concerns of efficiency and use 
of resources.  This type of information contributes to the court’s 
understanding of why the determinative sentence is “reasonable” in 
the case before it. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In addition to increased judicial discretion and overall lower 
sentences, the pendulum also can swing toward predictability and 
informed decision making for the defendant.  The new process in 
federal sentencing must allow a defendant to pursue, negotiate, 
and contract for what the defendant believes is a uniform, 
proportional, and fair sentence.  A renewed role for binding plea 
agreements in federal court could complement the progressive 
developments following Booker and restore some predictability and 
informed decision making for the individual defendant. 
